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The U.S. Supreme Court's Failure to
Fix Plea Bargaining:
The Impact of Lafler and Frye
by CYNTHIA ALKON*
Introduction
In the 2012 companion cases of Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v.
Frye, the United States Supreme Court held that there is a right to
effective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining, even when a
defendant later loses at trial.' Legal commentators suggested the
cases were "the single greatest revolution in the criminal justice
process since Gideon v. Wainwright,"2 that the cases will have a
"significant effect,"' and that they were "the term's decisions with the
greatest everyday impact on the criminal justice system."' But, will
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was a work in progress. Thank you also to Texas A&M University School of Law for
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1. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1391 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399,
1408 (2012).
2. Adam Liptak, Justices Expand Right ofAccused in Plea Bargains, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
21, 2012, at Al (quoting Professor Wesley M. Oliver), available at http://www. nytimes.com
/2012/03/22/us/supreme-court-says-defendants-have-right-to-good-lawyers.html?_r=0.
3. Erwin Chemerinsky, Effective Assistance of Counsel Now a Right in Plea
Bargaining, ABA JOURNAL (June 4, 2012, 7:45 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/chemerinksy effectiveassistanceofcounsel-now.arightjinpleabargaining/.
4. Sidney S. Rosdeitcher, Plea Bargaining and Effective Assistance of Counsel After
Lafler and Frye, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis
/plea-bargaining-and-effective-assistance-counsel-after-lafler-and-frye. See also Justin F.
Marceau, Embracing a New Era of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 14 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 1161, 1161 (2012) ("The explicit recognition that the right to counsel is not only, or even
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things really change for defendants in the wake of Lafler and Frye? Is
it realistic to expect these two decisions to mark the beginning of
serious or fundamental changes in plea bargaining? This Article will
explain why these cases are unlikely to create meaningful change in
how plea bargaining works because they focus on one narrow issue in
the context of plea bargaining: single instances of bad lawyering.
These cases do not address the larger systemic issues that create
serious concerns for defendants in plea bargaining. This Article
concludes that Lafler and Frye will have a limited impact because
they fail to address these larger issues.
Plea bargaining is deeply entrenched in the U.S. criminal justice
system. Overall, ninety-four percent to ninety-seven percent of
criminal cases are resolved by guilty pleas and not through trials.'
Plea bargaining in the United States began in the late eighteenth
century and became the "dominant means of resolving criminal
cases" by the nineteenth century.' By the mid-twentieth century, the
U.S. criminal justice system relied on plea bargaining to resolve the
vast majority of criminal cases.' The use of plea bargaining steadily
continued to increase and has now, in the early twenty-first century,
reached a point where there are jurisdictions with few, if any, criminal
trials." Cases that tend to go to trial are for more serious offenses and
those are only a small percentage.! This means that if a person is
arrested in the United States, they will most likely resolve the case
through plea bargaining. However, this reliance on plea bargaining
primarily a trial or truth protecting right promises to be a staggeringly important
constitutional event.").
5. See, e.g., Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.
6. See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF
PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 9-10 (2003). See also John H. Langbein, Understanding
the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 261 (1979).
7. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 495 (2004)
("From 1962 to 1991, the percentage of trials in criminal cases remained steady between
approximately 13 percent to 15 percent. However, since 1991, the percentage of trials in
criminal cases has steadily decreased (with the exception of one slight increase of 0.06
percent in 2001): from 12.6 percent in 1991 to less than 4.7 percent in 2002.").
8. Marisa Gerber, No Criminal Trials Held in Santa Cruz Since 2010, NOGALES
INTERNATIONAL (Feb. 8, 2012, 7:25 AM), http://www.nogalesinternational.com/scvsun/
news/no-criminal-trials-held-in-santa-cruz-county-since/article_2651fbde-5269-llel-b903-0
019bb2963f4.html.
9. For example, twenty-five percent of trials in Texas were capital murder cases and
a further twenty-one percent were non-capital murder cases. OFFICE OF COURT
ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FOR THE TEXAS JUDICIARY 35
(2006), available at http://www.txcourts.gov/pubs/AR2006/AR06.pdf.
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has not been without serious criticism, which has gone largely
unaddressed by the courts, including the Supreme Court in Lafler and
Frye. The criticism includes that plea bargaining fails to protect
defendants' rights,o is a form of torture, is overly coercive, 2 leads
defendants to "game" the system," fails to take victims into account, 4
reinforces inequality (particularly towards ethnic minorities)," leads
to disparate sentencing," gives defendants better deals than they
deserve," and undermines our system of justice due to its overuse at
the expense of jury trials." Critics of plea bargaining express concern
both about specific aspects of plea bargaining'9 and about the system
as a whole.20
10. See, e.g., H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized
Scourge of the Justice System, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 63, 75-78 (2011) (criticizing coercive
prosecutorial tactics in plea bargaining).
11. John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 12 (1978)
("We coerce the accused against whom we find probable cause to confess his guilt. To be
sure, our means are much politer; we use no rack, no thumbscrew, no Spanish boot to
mash his legs. But like the Europeans of distant centuries who did employ these
machines, we make it terribly costly for an accused to claim his right to the constitutional
safeguard of trial.").
12. See, e.g., Susan R. Klein, Enhancing the Judicial Role in Criminal Plea and
Sentence Bargaining, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2023, 2042-50 (2006) (recommending, in part,
improved disclosures to help decrease the coercive atmosphere for defendants).
13. See, e.g., ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY
OF LAW 85 (2001) (arguing that plea bargaining "transforms the act of confession from a
ritual of moral and social healing into a cynical game, reinforcing the criminal's alienated
view of society").
14. See, e.g., STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 26 (2012)
[hereinafter MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE] (discussing the historical transition from
trials where victims could watch, to a system that "retreated behind prison walls"). Bibas
also recommends more victim involvement. Id. at 150-53.
15. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION
IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 87-89 (2012) (specifically discussing plea bargaining
and generally explaining how the criminal justice system in the United States
disproportionately impacts African Americans).
16. See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, Peeking Behind the Plea Bargaining Process:
Missouri v. Frye & Lafler v. Cooper, 46 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 457,471 (2013).
17. See, e.g., id. at 472; Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Should We Really "Ban" Plea
Bargaining?: The Core Concerns of Plea Bargaining Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 770 (1998).
18. William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing Constitution, 40
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 80-82 (2006) ("The results of our own indifference toward jury
trials are already sadly apparent. Because we no longer seem very interested in using our
courtrooms, we are losing them.") Id. at 81.
19. See, e.g., Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55
STAN. L. REV. 29, 32 (2002) (arguing that prosecutorial "screening" could be an
alternative to plea bargains making for "a far more structured and reasoned charge
selection process."); Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-
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How defendants are treated in the plea bargaining process
21affects how people view our legal system. Unfortunately, an ever-
increasing percentage of the United States population has had first-
hand experience with the criminal justice system. For example, one
study reports that thirty percent of Americans have been arrested by
the age of twenty-three for a crime other than a minor traffic
offense. 2   The United States has the largest number of people in
prison and the highest incarceration rate in the world.23 Incarceration
rates are highest for African Americans and Latinos.24  These
numbers illustrate that the criminal justice system does not operate
separate from daily life in the United States-particularly in
communities with higher rates of incarceration. In addition to the
defendant, crime victims, and the friends, families, colleagues, and
employers of both defendants and victims also see how the criminal
justice system operates through the prism of these individual cases.
These views of the criminal justice system ultimately influence
Based Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1237 (2008) (To prevent the trial penalty, Covey
recommends sentencing rules to "prevent trial courts from imposing overly harsh trial
sentences.") Id. at 1237.; Michael M. O'Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42
GA. L. REV. 407, 426-31 (2008) (recommends changes in plea bargaining by prosecutors
to bring more procedural justice into the process).
20. One critic who argues for the abolition of plea bargaining because of "structural
flaws that impair both due process and cuime control values" is Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea
Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1979 (1992). See also, Russell Covey,
Reconsidering the Relationship Between Cognitive Psychology and Plea Bargaining, 91
MARQ. L. REV. 213, 247 (2007) ("what is needed is not piecemeal reform, but system-wide
transformation").
21. Wright & Miller, supra note 19, at 33 ("The public in general, and victims in
particular, lose faith in a system where the primary goal is processing and the secondary
goal is justice.").
22. Robert Brame, et al., Cumulative Prevalence of Arrest From Ages 8 to 23 in a
National Sample, PEDIATRICS (2011), http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/129/1/
21.full.pdf.
23. THE INT'L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, World Prison Brief,
http://www.prisonstudies.org/world-prison-brief (last visited Mar. 7, 2014). See also THE
SENTENCING PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/page.cfm?id=107 (last
visited Mar. 7, 2014).
24. The incarceration rate for Whites is 380/100,000, for African Americans is
2,207/100,000, and for Latinos is 966/100,000. PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, Incarceration
Rates by Race/Ethnicity (2010) [hereinafter Incarceration Rates by Race/Ethnicity],
available at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/graphs/raceinc.html (figures drawn from Lauren
E. Glaze & Erika Parks, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, Correctional Populations in the United States, 2011
(Nov. 2012)).
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attitudes about the legitimacy of our legal system.25 As stated above,
only a small percentage of criminal cases are resolved through jury
trials, while the rest are resolved through plea bargaining.26
Therefore, whether the plea bargaining process is fair has
implications far beyond the single defendant in each case.
Lafler and Frye do not address the larger systemic problems in
plea bargaining. Three broad systemic categories together define
how plea bargaining works in the United States for the average
defendant. The first category is Indigent Defense Structures. This
category includes how lawyers are appointed for indigent defendants
and how these appointment and institutional structures determine
what kind of work a defense lawyer can do for a particular client,
including how much time they can spend preparing and handling each
case. The second category is Prosecutorial Power Structures under
which prosecutors wield far greater power than mere discretion. In
large part, this is due to the fact that legislatures have given
prosecutors power to charge a wide variety of offenses for
substantially similar acts. This power combines with a virtually
unchecked authority to add or dismiss charges or enhancements to
charges during the plea bargaining process. This frequently leaves
defendants with few options but to accept whatever plea bargain the
prosecutor offers with no leverage to negotiate a different or better
deal. The third category is the Legal Framework Structures which,
for purposes of this Article, are limited to the legal framework
surrounding plea bargaining and its impact on defendants. This
includes the right to discovery or delineation of the obligations of
individual defense lawyers in the negotiation process. Arguably, this
is the only category that will change due to Lafler and Frye.
However, as this Article will explain, addressing Legal Framework
Structures will not make plea bargaining substantially different and, if
prior experience is a guide, will instead help to further entrench
already existing practices at the expense of both defendants and
fundamental fairness.
25. A Gallup poll found that only 29 percent of Americans "have a 'great deal' or
'quite a lot' of confidence in the criminal justice system." Ron Faucheux, By the Numbers:
American Lack Confidence in the Legal System, THE ATLANTIC (July 6, 2012, 7:24 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.comlnationallarchive/2012/07/by-the-numbers-americans-lack--con
fidence-in-the-legal-system/259458/. See also Cynthia Alkon, Plea Bargaining as Legal
Transplant: A Good Idea for Troubled Criminal Justice Systems?, 19 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 355, 379-80 (2010).
26. Ninety-four percent to ninety-seven percent of criminal convictions are due to
plea bargaining. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012).
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Section I of this Article discusses the basic legal framework for
plea bargaining in the United States, arguing that the Supreme Court
has not touched basic issues that have serious implications for fairness
to defendants in plea bargaining. Section II discusses the Lafler and
Frye decisions and the criticism that they will fail to bring far-reaching
change due to the Court's limited focus on competent assistance of
counsel.27 Section III examines the Indigent Defense Structures and
Prosecutorial Power Structures left untouched by Lafler and Frye,
which continue to create serious problems for defendants caught in
the criminal justice system. Section IV explores the reasons for plea
bargaining in the criminal justice system to understand why it may be
so difficult for the Court to address larger, structural problems.
Section V analyzes plea bargaining as a form of negotiation. This
section considers the negotiation environment, and explains why
defendants experience problems in plea bargaining due to its often
highly adversarial nature, the serious power imbalances, the problem
of innocent defendants pleading guilty, and the trial penalty. As this
section discusses, plea bargaining is an informal dispute resolution
process that can, at best, reflect the larger system within which it
operates)8 Finally, Section VI concludes that Lafler and Frye are
unlikely to lead to meaningful change in the Indigent Defense
Structures or Prosecutorial Power Structures, but will possibly make
some limited changes within the Legal Framework Structures due to
their focus on competent assistance of counsel issues. Although
Lafler and Frye may help bring some definition to the most extreme
bad conduct of lawyers, these cases, and the cases that are most likely
to reach the Court in their wake, are not positioned to make systemic
changes in the key areas of Indigent Defense Structures and
Prosecutorial Power Structures. Instead, they will continue to focus
on plea bargaining in the context of individualized cases, but not
address the larger structural problems.
27. Darryl K. Brown, Lafler, Frye and Our Still Un-Regulated Plea Bargaining
System, 25 FED. SENT'G REP. 131, 132 (2012) ("Understood merely as examples of new
occasions for Strickland claims, Frye and Lafler are likely of little practical importance in
the daily, ubiquitous practice of plea bargaining. Only a small number of defense
attorneys, presumably, will commit the obvious lapses that the lawyers for Frye and
Cooper did."). However, some have argued that the natural progression of Supreme
Court jurisprudence following these cases will be to address issues of fairness in plea
bargaining. See, e.g., Russell D. Covey, Plea-Bargaining Law after Lafler and Frye, 51
DUQ. L. REV. 595, 605-13 (2013) [hereinafter Plea-Bargaining Law] (focusing on
discovery issues following Lafler and Frye).
28. Some argue that Lafler and Frye indicate the beginning of a new era for issues
beyond assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Plea-Bargaining Law, supra note 27, at 623.
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I. Plea Bargaining's Legal Framework
Plea bargaining is "a form of negotiation by which the prosecutor
and defense counsel enter into an agreement resolving one or more
criminal charges against the defendant without a trial."29 In the
United States, three basic types of plea bargaining exist: charge
bargaining, sentence bargaining, and sentence recommendation
agreements." In charge bargaining, the prosecutor may agree to not
charge particular offenses, or to dismiss one or more of the charges.
Sentence bargaining occurs when the prosecution and defense
negotiate the sentence or punishment, while agreeing to the charges
as filed.32 Plea negotiations often include both sentence and charge
bargaining." The third type of plea bargaining is sentencing
recommendation agreements where the prosecutor agrees to
recommend a particular sentence to the judge; this is more common
in the federal system.' Depending on the seriousness and complexity
of the case, plea negotiations can be fast and simple, or drawn out and
complex."
The legal framework, or the basic rules for plea bargaining, do
not distinguish between a sentence bargain, charge bargain, or both.
Overall, there are few formal rules for plea bargaining,36 making it a
"free market that sometimes resembled a Turkish Bazaar."" There is
no right to a plea bargain, thus it is entirely within the discretion of
29. NICHOLAS G. HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING 1 (2004).
30. See, e.g., id. at 1-2, 90-100.
31. For a more extensive list of possible plea bargaining outcomes, see id. at 90-92.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2012 GUIDELINES MANUAL [USSG] § 6B1.2(b)
(Nov. 2012), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/.
35. See, e.g., HERMAN, supra note 29, at 65-76, 77-96. In simple cases-such as
driving under the influence of alcohol or drug cases-prosecutors and defense lawyers
know the "standard deal" in the individual court or jurisdiction. The "negotiation," thus,
often simply consists of the prosecutor stating the offer and the defense lawyer confirming
that her client accepts the deal. One scholar refers to these types of plea negotiations as
"routine processing." DOUGLAS W. MAYNARD, INSIDE PLEA BARGAINING: THE
LANGUAGE OF NEGOTIATION 78 (1984).
36. Ninety-four percent to ninety-seven percent of criminal convictions are due to
plea bargaining. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012). The Supreme Court has
been more interested in regulating trials and has had, historically, less interest in plea
bargaining. Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat
Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (2011) [hereinafter
Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market].
37. Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 36, at 1119.
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the prosecutor to decide whether to offer a deal. This does not,
however, mean that defendants must always proceed to trial since the
defendant may have the option to "plead open" to the court, leaving
it to the judge to decide the sentence, with or without the benefit of a
pre-arranged plea deal." However, if the defendant pleads open to
the court, he is "pleading to the sheet"; this means he will have to
plead to all charges, as filed, because the judge will not be able to
dismiss any charges or enhancements on her own motion.' If the
prosecutor does offer a plea deal, it is not final until the judge agrees
to accept it.41
Despite its widespread use, it was not until 1970 that the
Supreme Court specifically recognized the constitutionality of plea
bargaining in Brady v. United States.42  Before Lafler and Frye, the
Court placed few limits on what it would accept in plea bargaining.
Generally, a guilty plea must be voluntary and intelligent.43 That is, a
defendant should understand what he is doing, act freely and
knowingly, and accept (or decline) a plea bargain without physical
coercion.4 Prosecutors should also not breach previous agreements.45
38. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977). With more serious cases, such
as homicide, prosecutors may not make any offer. In addition, sometimes prosecutors will
decide that, for whatever reason, they cannot evaluate a case. For example, the
prosecution in Tarrant County, Texas, refused to make an offer in a case where a teacher
was accused of sixteen felony counts of improper relationship between an educator and a
student arising from allegations that the teacher had sex with five male students. The
students were all legal adults. The prosecution did not make an offer because "we wanted
a Tarrant County jury to evaluate and as the moral conscience of the community say this is
what we think of this kind of behavior and we got a very clear message from the jury."
The jury sentenced the teacher to five years, concurrent, on each count, out of a potential
maximum of twenty years on each count, consecutive. Deanna Boyd, Ex-Kennedale
Teacher Guilty of Sex with Students; Mom Asks Jury for 'Mercy,' FORT WORTH STAR
TELEGRAM (Aug. 18, 2012), reprinted at http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencinglaw
and-policy/2012/08/intriguing-jury-sentence-in-texas-for-female-teacher-having-group-sex-
with-adult-students.html.
39. See Eric M. Matheny, The Risks of Pleading Open to the Court, ERIC MATHENY
LAW BLOG (Mar. 3, 2012, 12:55 PM), http://www.ericmathenylaw.com/Criminal-Defense-
Blog/2012/March/The-Risks-Of-Pleading-Open-To-The-Court.aspx.
40. There are exceptions to this. For example, under the three-strikes law in
California, a defendant could move to have a judge "strike a strike" "in the interests of
justice." People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497, 508-12 (1996).
41. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c).
42. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751-52 (1970) ("guilty pleas are not
constitutionally forbidden").
43. Id. at 748.
44. Id. at 748-50.
45. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 265 (1971) (The fact that the prosecutor
who made the agreement is no longer handling the case does not change this as "[lhe staff
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For example, the Court remanded a case when the prosecutor failed
to stick to the original plea agreement after the defendant entered his
plea of guilty;46 to do otherwise would be an "unfulfilled promise" or
governmental deception.47 In Brady, the Court decided that the fact
that a defendant took a deal to avoid the death penalty was not a
problem.48 The Court held that the defendant accepted the deal
knowingly and voluntarily, and that a prosecutor's threat to seek the
death penalty if the deal was not accepted was not coercive because
the death penalty could be lawfully imposed.4 ' The Court has also
held that it is not a violation of due process if a prosecutor threatens
to reindict the defendant with more serious charges if he refuses the
plea deal."o
The Court considers plea deals "intelligent" even if the
defendant lacks information about the evidence that will be admitted
at trial against him or how that may impact his chances of conviction."
In general, under Brady v. Maryland, the prosecutor must disclose
"evidence favorable to the accused.. . where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment."52 Brady, however, did not involve a
plea bargain, and the Court has not specified what evidence must be
disclosed before a plea deal.
In 2002, in United States v. Ruiz, the Supreme Court decided, in
part, that a defendant did not have a constitutional right to
impeachment information before entering a plea agreement." In
Ruiz, pursuant to a "fast track" plea agreement, the defendant would
lawyers in a prosecutor's office have the burden of 'letting the left hand know what the
right hand is doing' or has done. That the breach of agreement was inadvertent does not
lessen its impact.") Id. at 262.
46. Id. at 262 ("[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or
agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or
consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." Additionally, "appropriate recognition of
the duties of the prosecution in relation to promises made in the negotiation of pleas of
guilty will be best served by remanding the case.").
47. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 505 (1984) (distinguishing the facts from
Santobello).
48. Brady, 397 U.S. at 755.
49. Id. at 751.
50. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364-65 (1978). William Stuntz stated, "In
retrospect, Bordenkircher appears to be one of the great missed opportunities of
American constitutional law." William Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: The Rise of Plea
Bargaining and the Decline of the Rule of Law (Harv. Pub. L., Working Paper No. 120,
2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=854284.
51. Brady, 397 U.S. at 757. See also United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629-30 (2002).
52. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
53. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 633.
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have the right to receive any information relating to her "factual
innocence," but would be required to waive the right to impeachment
information about any witnesses and any information that might
support an affirmative defense at trial.54 The defendant turned down
the deal as she was unwilling to waive the right to impeachment
information." The Court was concerned that requiring disclosure of
impeachment information would "seriously interfere with the
Government's interest in securing those guilty pleas that are factually
justified, desired by defendants, and help to secure the efficient
administration of justice."" The Court further stated that, "[i]t is
particularly difficult to characterize impeachment information as
critical information of which the defendant must always be aware
prior to pleading guilty given the random way in which such
information may, or may not, help a particular defendant."" This
means that defendants do not have the right to impeachment
information. This is problematic because it may limit the defendant's
leverage in plea negotiations since impeachment evidence may help
secure a better and ultimately more fair deal. It also means that
defendants may be accepting plea deals without ever knowing that
they have this possible leverage and could have potentially gotten a
better deal.
It was not until 2010 that the Supreme Court, in Padilla v.
Kentucky, started to look more critically at plea bargaining." In
Padilla, the Court held that the defendant had the right to be advised
by his lawyer about the immigration consequences of his guilty plea
and that defense counsel's failure to advise is a violation of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel." Lafler and Frye continue this
approach, holding that the defendant has a right to competent
assistance of counsel in the plea bargaining process, but in both
54. Id. at 631, 633. Under a "fast track" plea agreement, the defendant waives
"indictment, trial, and an appeal in exchange for a reduced sentence recommendation."
Id. at 622. The defendant must agree to the plea deal under a deadline, currently thirty
days from the date the defendant is taken into custody on federal charges, to take
advantage of the offered reduced sentence. See, e.g., Memorandum from James M. Cole,
Deputy Attorney General on Department Policy on Early Disposition or "Fast Track"
Programs, 3 (Jan. 31, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/fast-track-program.pdf.
55. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 625.
56. Id. at 631.
57. Id. at 630.
58. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
59. See id. at 374; Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 36, at 1120
("With Padilla, the Court has now begun to interpret due process and the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel to impose meaningful safeguards on the plea process.").
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instances the Court remained silent on prosecutorial behavior, such as
the use of hard-bargaining tactics. In general, the Court has been
reluctant to find ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial level."
And, despite Lafler, Frye, and Padilla, it is likely that ineffective
assistance of counsel claims will remain difficult cases for a defendant
to bring and win."
The Court has hesitated to find due process violations in the plea
bargaining process itself, and the cases criticizing plea bargaining
have been limited to assistance-of-counsel claims or claims with a
narrow due process focus on what constitutes "knowing and
intelligent."62 The problem with this approach is that the Court has
tended to limit scrutiny to one side of the plea bargaining process: the
defense. Thus far, the Court has tended not to object to what
prosecutors do during plea bargaining as long as they do not back out
of a previously agreed deal or trick the defendant." For example, the
Court has not objected to prosecutors using hard-bargaining tactics
such as threatening more serious charges if the defendant does not
accept an offered deal." Also, as discussed above, the Court has
60. See, e.g., Nancy J. King, Enforcing Effective Assistance After Martinez, 122 YALE
L.J. 2428, 2438-48 (2013) (explaining how few cases are granted review in ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, both federally and locally, and how of those few cases that are
granted review, even fewer win their cases).
61. See, e.g., id. For an analysis pre-Padilla, Lafler and Frye, see THE CONSTITUTION
PROJECr, Justice Denied: America's Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right to
Counsel 39-43 (2009), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf.
62. See, e.g., Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 637 (1976) (narrowly held that
when defendant did not understand a critical element of the charge-in this case, intent to
kill-the defendant's guilty plea was invalid because due process requires the defendant to
receive "real notice of the true nature of the charge against him") (citing Smith v.
O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941)). See also Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra
note 36, at 1124.
63. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 265 (1971). For a discussion
about the Brady Trilogy and how the Court decided to handle questions of coercion in
plea bargaining, see ARTHUR ROSETT & DONALD CRESSEY, JUSTICE BY CONSENT: PLEA
BARGAINS IN THE AMERICAN COURTHOUSE 61 (1976) ("Each of these cases presented a
situation in which the law was structured to place the most extraordinary pressures on a
defendant to plead guilty and not to challenge by trial the charges against him. Each was
an instance in which it was most questionable whether the law complied with the standard
that a guilty plea must be a free and voluntary act. The Court was faced with the choice of
abandoning the voluntariness standard, stretching its meaning beyond the range of
common usage, or declaring invalid many thousands of the guilty plea convictions for
serious state crimes, and releasing or retrying large portions of the prison population.").
64. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364-65 (1978). For a discussion of how
the Court in Bordenkircher "authorized" hard bargaining tactics, see Josh Bowers,
Fundamental Fairness and the Path from Santobello to Padilla: A Response to Professor
Bibas, 2 CALIF. L. REv. CIRCUIT 52, 59 (2011). The concern is not that hard bargaining is
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declined to require prosecutors to turn over discovery, such as
impeachment evidence, pre-plea."
Beyond the constitutional requirements, there are statutory
requirements. However, many of these rules simply reflect the
constitutional minimums that the Court has established and,
therefore, concentrate on procedural issues.6 The rules surrounding
plea bargaining do not focus on the negotiation process itself, but
rather on the formal process of the court's acceptance of a
defendant's guilty plea after the prosecution and defense have agreed
on a deal.6 ' For example, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure enumerates specific rights, waived by a defendant during a
plea deal, about which the judge must notify the defendant. Rule 11
also requires that the judge get the factual basis for the plea.6 Rule
11 further specifies that the defendant should be advised about the
charges, and the maximum and minimum penalties.9 There are also
rules concerning what judges can and cannot do. For example, under
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, judges cannot "participate"
in plea negotiation discussions.o The rules in state criminal
procedure codes regarding plea bargaining also tend to focus more on
the form of the guilty plea and procedures of accepting the plea in
court." As Stefanos Bibas observed, "a $100 credit-card purchase of
a microwave oven is regulated more carefully than a guilty plea that
results in years of imprisonment."72
in and of itself an ethical violation, but rather that hard bargaining in the context of a plea
bargaining raises serious concerns about the fundamental fairness of the process. For a
discussion about how hard bargaining is supported by structural inequalities, see the
discussion on Prosecutorial Power Structures, infra Section III.B, and the discussion of
power imbalances in plea bargaining, infra Section IV.B.
65. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002); Plea-Bargaining Law, supra
note 27, at 600 ("the Court should reassess prior plea-bargaining precedents and seek to
place meaningful boundaries on prosecutorial coercion").
66. Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 36, at 1124.
67. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (holding that there needs
to be a record to establish that the defendant voluntarily and knowingly entered his plea);
Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 36, at 1124.
68. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1), (b)(3).
69. Id.
70. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1). See also United States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139,
2147-48 (2013).
71. See, e.g., TEx. CODE PROC. CODE ANN. art. 26.13 (2011).
72. Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 36, at 1153.
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II. Lafler and Frye
In 2012, in Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye, the Supreme
Court held that there is a right to effective assistance of counsel
during plea bargaining even if a defendant later goes to trial and loses
the trial.73 In Frye, the defendant's lawyer failed to convey a plea
offer before it expired.74 As a result, instead of taking the original
misdemeanor offer, the defendant pled guilty to a felony of driving
with a revoked license and was sentenced to three years."
In Lafler, the defendant was charged with four counts, including
assault with intent to commit murder." The victim was shot a total of
four times in the hip, buttock, and abdomen.7 The defendant's
lawyer conveyed the offer, but did so with advice that any first-year
law student should have known not to give. He told his client that the
prosecution "would be unable to establish intent to murder" because
the victim was shot below the waist." This was such clearly bad
advice that, on appeal, the parties stipulated the advice was wrong as
a matter of law." Based on this poor advice, the defendant turned
down a plea deal that was over one third less than his eventual
sentence. He rejected an offer of 51 to 85 months in prison (4.25 to
7.08 years) and was sentenced to 185 to 360 months in prison (15.4 to
30 years) after the jury convicted him at trial.' While there were no
errors in the trial itself, the Court found that the trial did not cure
whatever problems may have occurred during the plea bargaining
process, stating that "[e]ven if the trial itself is free from
constitutional flaw, the defendant who goes to trial instead of taking a
more favorable plea may be prejudiced from either a conviction on
more serious counts or the imposition of a more severe sentence."
These cases are both textbook examples of bad lawyering, and as
such, the Court did not articulate a new standard for competence or
effective assistance of counsel. It simply acknowledged that the
73. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1391 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399,
1408 (2012).
74. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404.
75. Id. at 1404-05 (although the facts are complicated by the defendant picking up a
new case after the offer expired and before he ultimately plead guilty).
76. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1384.
80. Id. at 1383-84.
81. Id. at 1386.
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already existing professional standard should apply during the plea
bargaining stage.2 Beyond stating that these cases do not meet basic
competency requirements, the Court did not address what competent
negotiation skills would be in the plea bargaining stage of a criminal
case.8' As Justice Anthony Kennedy explained:
Bargaining is, by its nature, defined to a substantial
degree by personal style. The alternative courses and
tactics in negotiation are so individual that it may be
neither prudent nor practicable to try to elaborate or
define detailed standards for the proper discharge of
defense counsel's participation in the process.
Justice Kennedy illustrates how far the Court still has to go in terms
of understanding the basics of how negotiation works in the context
of plea bargaining."
The Court recognized, however, the importance of plea
bargaining and explicitly stated what every lawyer and judge working
in the criminal justice system in the United States already knew:
"criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a
system of trials."' This marks the beginning of a noteworthy shift as
the Court is moving beyond viewing trials as the "touchstone" in
criminal cases." The Court is also moving beyond viewing trials as
the cure to any problems arising from the plea-bargaining process,
stating that it is "insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of a fair
trial as a backstop that inoculates any errors in the pre-trial process."8
82. See, e.g., Plea-Bargaining Law, supra note 27, at 610-13.
83. Some have argued that developing basic competency standards for negotiating
plea bargains is the logical conclusion of Lafler and Frye. See Rishi Batra, Lafler and
Frye: A New Constitutional Standard for Negotiation, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICr RESOL.
309 (2013).
84. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012).
85. The year before this decision, Justice Kennedy also wrote for the majority that,
"[p]lea bargains are the result of complex negotiations suffused with uncertainty .... "
Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 741 (2011). This statement, although accurate in the
context of Premo v. Moore, indicates that the Court does not understand how most plea
bargaining occurs, as many cases are not factually or legally complex. Therefore, these
plea negotiations are straightforward without much complexity, at least on the face of it.
86. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388.
87. Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 36, at 1122.
88. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.
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The Court went on to state that "the negotiation of a plea bargain ...
is almost always the critical point for a defendant.""
In his dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia lamented that the Court
was heralding a "new boutique of constitutional jurisprudence" in
holding that defendants have a right to effective assistance of counsel
in the plea-bargaining process." Justice Scalia criticizes this move, as
it "elevates plea bargaining from a necessary evil to a constitutional
entitlement." 91 There was no real problem in Lafler, according to
Justice Scalia, as the defendant had a "full and fair trial, was found
guilty of all charges by a unanimous jury, and was given the sentence
the law prescribed."" He went on to predict that "there will be cases
galore" due to the rulings in Lafler and Frye.' Some commentators
agree on this point, as Russell Covey observed, "these cases
potentially foretell a transformational evolution of criminal
procedure." 94
Others disagree that Lafler and Frye are groundbreaking.
Practitioners question whether these cases add anything since
competent defense lawyers already reach the minimal standards set
by the Court." Albert Alschuler considers the cases to be nothing
more than "small band-aids for a festering wound."96 Alschuler
maintains that these cases will simply make sure that the "river of
guilty pleas [keeps] flowing."' Gerald Lynch states that the "only
surprise about the Supreme Court's decisions . . . is that there were
four dissents."" Lynch goes on to say that Lafler and Frye "do not
represent a novelty in the law, but rather continue the longstanding
recognition by the courts that 'plea bargaining' is an integral part of
89. Id.
90. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391.
91. Id. at 1397.
92. Id. at 1392.
93. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1413.
94. Plea-Bargaining Law, supra note 27, at 608.
95. See, e.g., Cynthia Alkon, Plea Bargaining: Just as it Ever Was, 10 MAYHEw-HITE
REP. ON DISP. RESOL. & THE COURTS (2012) (on file with author), also available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/epub/mayhew-hite/2012/05/plea-bargaining-just-as-it-ever-was/.
96. See Albert W. Alschuler, Lafler and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for a Festering
Wound, 51 DUQ. L. REv. 673 (2013).
97. Id. at 681.
98. Gerald E. Lynch, Frye and Lafler: No Big Deal, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 39 (2012),
http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/supreme-court/frye-and-lafler:-
no-big-deall.
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our criminal justice system."" Some have expressed concern about
the harm that these cases could do, such as "pushing" defense lawyers
to encourage their clients to take the first deal offered rather than
face allegations of ineffective assistance.1oo
HI. The Three Structures and Plea Bargaining
To understand why the skeptics are right in expressing doubts
about Lafler and Frye's impact, it is important to examine the three
structures underlying how plea bargaining works-indigent defense,
prosecutorial power, and legal framework-to illustrate the
limitations of the Lafler and Frye decisions, as well as the challenges
for reforming plea bargaining more broadly. To make meaningful
changes in plea bargaining, the criminal justice system must address
the systemic problems that go beyond the idea that plea bargaining
reform should focus simply on making sure defendants are better
informed."o'
A. Indigent Defense Structures
Indigent defense structures refer to the way in which indigent
legal services are provided. This includes both the services of a
lawyer, and the resources a defense lawyer needs in order to provide
competent representation, such as investigative and expert witness
services. The vast majority of criminal defendants in the United
States rely on appointed counsel," which has a substantial impact on
how the criminal justice system, including plea bargaining, works.
For indigent defendants, access to legal counsel is still a serious
challenge despite the Supreme Court's decision over fifty years ago in
Gideon v. Wainwright that indigent defendants have a right to state-
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Jed. S. Rakoff, Frye and Lafler: Bearers of Mixed Messages, 122 YALE
L.J. ONLINE 25 (2012), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/
supreme-court/frye-and-lafler:-bearers-of-mixed-messages/.
101. Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 36, at 1154 ("The most basic
and important reforms focus on ensuring that defendants know what they are doing.").
Although, in the same article, Bibas clearly recognizes the importance of other factors and
the limitations of the singular focus on effective assistance of counsel. See id. at 1153-59
(recommending rules to help regulate plea bargaining using a consumer-protection
model).
102. Over eighty percent of all felony defendants cannot pay for a lawyer on their
own. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, Defense Counsel in Criminal Cases 1 (2000), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/ pdfldccc.pdf.
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appointed counsel."o3 In reality, defendants may wait months before a
lawyer is appointed."
In misdemeanor cases, defendants are more likely to go
unrepresented and waive their right to a lawyer under questionable
circumstances.os Misdemeanor defendants overwhelmingly enter
guilty pleas, often without knowing the serious collateral
consequences of the conviction.'" Defendants facing both
misdemeanor and felony charges often do not meet their lawyer until
their first court date-which for many defendants may be their last
court date because they plead guilty at arraignment to get out of
jail.i
Defendants suffering from mental illness, developmental
disabilities, or substance abuse-a significant percentage of all
criminal defendantsos-often have cognitive limitations that may
make it difficult for them to quickly understand what is happening
with their cases and what their options are. The fact that a client may
need more time to talk with their lawyer and to understand what is
being explained is rarely an acceptable reason to give these clients
more time with their appointed lawyer because appointed lawyers
work under a system that constrains the amount of time they can
spend with each client.'" The end result is that appointed lawyers
103. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963).
104. Due to lack of funding, there have been examples of defendants waiting months
in custody before a lawyer is appointed. For example, a man in Georgia charged with
murder waited eight months for a lawyer. Deborah Hastings, Nationwide, Public
Defender Offices are in Crisis, THE SEATTLE TIMES (June 3, 2009, 6:49 PM),
http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2009296598 apusnodefense.html.
105. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 61, at 8.
106. Id. See also Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective
Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 297-303 (2011)
(explaining the variety of possible serious collateral consequences to misdemeanor
convictions).
107. Nancy Albert-Goldberg, Los Angeles County Public Defender Office in
Perspective, 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 445, 461 (2009). See also Roberts, supra note 106, at 297-
303 (explaining the variety of possible serious collateral consequences to misdemeanor
convictions).
108. "[I]f all mental disorders-including substance abuse disorders-are included, the
prevalence of mental disorder in incarcerated populations is over 70 [percent]." John P.
Petrila and Allison D. Redlich, Mental Illness and the Courts: Some Reflections on Judges as
Innovators, 43 CT. REV.: THE J. OF THE AM. JUDGES ASSOC. 164, 164 (2007), available at
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1237&context=ajacourtreview.
109. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at 86.
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often do not have enough time for meaningful communications with
their clients, particularly in less serious cases."o
As will be discussed, money can have a significant impact on how
well lawyers can do their jobs. Budget limitations can mean that
lawyers have less time to talk to their clients, limited ability to
investigate cases, and fewer experts to aid in case preparation. So far,
the Court has not directly confronted these systemic problems in
examining claims of effective assistance of counsel. However, to
understand how plea bargaining works, it is important to first
understand the variety of ways in which indigent defendants get a
lawyer and what this may mean for the quality of their defense. This
section will then discuss how budgetary problems can influence
effective assistance of counsel.
1. Appointment of Lawyers
There is no uniform approach to appointing indigent defense
lawyers as each jurisdiction uses different systems, including public
defenders and publicly appointed private counsel."' Most large
counties rely on public defender offices.112 There are continuing
questions about whether the way in which a lawyer is appointed to
handle an indigent defendant's case impacts the quality of his
representation. In comparing public defenders, publicly appointed
private counsel, contract lawyers, and privately retained lawyers,
studies vary on which type of counsel results in better outcomes for
the client.'13 Overall, however, researchers have found that publicly
110. See id.
111. For a good description of the various approaches, see generally Robert L.
Spangenberg and Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United States, 58
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31 (1995).
112. Only eight of the hundred largest counties in the United States did not have
public defender programs in 2000. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, National Survey of Indigent Defense
Systems, 1999, Indigent Defense Services in Large Counties, 1999 (2000), available at http://
www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=996.
113. Some studies have found that public defenders get better outcomes. See
generally James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer
Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154
(2012); Thomas H. Cohen, Who's Better at Defending Criminals? Does type of Defense
Attorney Matter in Terms of Producing Favorable Case Outcomes? (July 1, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1876474 (finding that publicly
retained private lawyers get worse outcomes for their clients than public defenders,
although public defenders and privately retained counsel get similar outcomes); Michael
Roach, Explaining the Outcome Gap Between Different Types of Indigent Defense
Counsel: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Effects (Apr. 2011) (unpublished
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appointed private counsel are less effective than public defenders."'
All things being equal, publicly appointed private counsel tend to
perform worse than professional public defenders in both federal and
state courts."' So far, the Supreme Court has not examined how the
right to a lawyer may be affected by the way that a lawyer is hired and
paid, which are factors that these studies indicate may have a
significant impact on whether an indigent defendant receives
adequate assistance of counsel.
Indigent defendants who rely on appointed counsel commonly
face the problem of lacking access to a lawyer or having access only to
an overextended lawyer. These problems are due to the indigent
defendant's inability to pay for a private lawyer's time and attention.
Due to caseload pressures and pay structures, most appointed lawyers
cannot take most cases to trial.'16 However, as discussed above, most
cases likely do not need to go to trial."' Thus, for defendants who
rely on appointed counsel, the more pressing issue is their lawyer's
limited time to conduct basic interviews and counseling, and to
prepare the case for a better plea deal.
2. Limited Indigent Defense Budgets
Regardless of how lawyers are appointed, due to budgetary
constraints they tend to carry high caseloads and have limited time
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1839651 (found public defenders did better than
publicly appointed private counsel); Radha lyengar, An Analysis of the Performance of
Federal Indigent Defense Counsel (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
13187, 2007), https://www.nber.org/papers/wl3187 (comparing appointed counsel to public
defenders in the federal system and concluding that public defenders do better in terms of
lower conviction rates and lower sentences). Other studies have found that privately
retained lawyers do better for their clients by, for example, negotiating deals for a reduced
time in custody. See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Shepherd, An
Empirical Study of Public Defender Effectiveness: Self-Selection by the "Marginally
Indigent, " 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 223 (2005) (concluding that private counsel did better by
an average of three years less time in custody for their clients compared to public
defenders).
114. See generally Iyengar, supra note 113, at 2-5; Cohen, supra note 113.
115. See id.
116. This can be an acute problem in counties that pay only "flat fees" for each case a
lawyer handles. Such pay structures discourage trials and encourage early pleas. John P.
Gross, Part I: Rationing Justice: The Underfunding of Assigned Counsel Systems-a 50-
State Survey of Trial Court Assigned Counsel Rates, NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIM. DEF. LAW. 8-
10 (2013) (reporting that "at least 20 states" use flat fee contracts or pay a flat rate per
case), available at http://www.nacdl.org/reports/gideonat50/rationingjustice.
117. See supra Section III.B.
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for each individual client."' In 1973, the National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recommended
that criminal defense lawyers carry no more than 150 felonies or 400
misdemeanor cases in any given year."9 However, most public
defender offices are unable to enforce these caseload limits. 120  For
example, the Department of Justice reported in 2007 that seventy-
three percent of "county-based public defender offices" nationwide
exceeded this limit.121 Contributing to the higher caseloads is the lack
of formal caseload limits, with the Department of Justice reporting
that only fifteen percent of surveyed public defender offices had such
formal limits and only thirty-six percent had the authority to refuse
cases due to high caseloads."
The constraints on lawyers typically increase as budgets
decrease. One example is the effect of federal sequestration on the
Office of the Federal Public Defender.123  Due to the sequestration,
the Office lost nine percent of its budget and planned to close offices
124in over twenty states. Key staff have retired or been laid off,
including investigators.' Because it is an agency that operates with
little overhead, the main area where budgets can be cut is staff
118. See, e.g., John Rudolf, Pennsylvania Public Defenders Rebel Against Crushing
Caseloads, THE HUFFINGTON POST (June 16, 2012, 11:18 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/2012/05/30/pennsylvania-public-defenders_n_1556192.html.
119. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, Census of Public Defender Offices, County Based and Local Public Defender
Office, 2007, at 8 (2010) [hereinafter 2007 Census], http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=
pbdetail&iid=2211.
120. Hastings, supra note 104.
121. Based on data from 530 public defender offices in twenty-seven states and the
District of Columbia. 2007 Census, supra note 119, at 1, 3, and 8-10.
122. 2007 Census, supra note 119, at 8. The Los Angeles County Public Defender is
one office that has this option. Under California law, public defender agencies can declare
that they are "unavailable" to handle new cases due to high caseloads. Albert-Goldberg,
supra note 107, at 463-64 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.2(e) (2008)), although there are
some limits to when a public defender can declare themselves "unavailable" in practice.
123. Sam Stein & Ryan J. Reilly, Sequestration's Biggest Victim: The Public Defender
System, THE HUFFINGTON POST (July 22, 2013, 12:15 PM) [hereinafter Sequestration's
Biggest Victim], http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/22/sequestration-public-defender
n_3624111.html.
124. Id. By contrast, the Department of Justice is not discussing closing offices or
laying off workers. Attorney General Holder instead made "extensive cuts to travel,
training, contracts, and other areas of spending." Memorandum from Eric Holder,
Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sequestration and Safety Actions Regarding the
Bureau of Prisons Inst., at 2 (Mar. 22, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/docs/
sequestration-safety-actions.pdf.
125. Stein & Reilly, supra note 123.
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salaries. As a result, it is expected that the Office will lose 2,700 jobs
within the next two years.'26 In the short term, there are stories of
individual public defenders paying out of their own pockets for
traveling costs to see imprisoned clients.127  Notwithstanding
assurances that these cuts have not impacted the quality of
representation, it is clear that the cuts are affecting how federal public
defenders do their jobs. 128 In some offices, the most experienced
lawyers have resigned to save other staff jobs.129  Additionally,
investigators needed to fully prepare the lawyers' cases have resigned,
taken early retirement, or been laid off."o Despite their devotion to
their clients, lawyers need basic resources and adequate
compensation to do a minimally competent job. In the short term,
individual federal public defenders are undoubtedly making do with
less while attempting to provide the same level of legal services; this
situation, however, is hard to sustain in the long run.
In addition, related rights, beyond the right to counsel, are likely
to suffer with continued cutbacks. In response to the sequestration
and furlough days, some federal courts are reducing the number of
days that they hear criminal cases.'31 This ultimately delays cases or,
at the very least, makes court days more hectic and pressure filled, as
the same number of cases will need to be called more quickly.3 2
Ironically, the decrease in staffing in the Office of the Federal Public
Defender is unlikely to save money as there are additional costs, such
as defendants spending additional days in custody due to court
delays.'33  The potentially bigger financial cost is that, as the
sequestration continues, the Office of the Federal Public Defender is
declining cases, meaning that private lawyers will have to be
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF COLORADO, Order
Limiting the Scheduling of Criminal Trials and Hearings Due to Budgetary Constraints
and Furloughs (Mar. 25, 2013), available at https://www.cod.uscourts.gov/Documents/
Orders/13-GeneralOrder-1.pdf.
132. Lisa Rein, Public Defenders Say Sequester is Hurting Poor Clients, WASH. POST
(July 24, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2013/07/24
/public-defenders-say-sequester-is-hurting-poor-clients/.
133. Dorothy J. Samuels, So, About Your Right to an Attorney, N.Y. TIMES (July 25,
2013, 9:37 AM), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/25/so-about-your-right-to-an-
attorney/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
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appointed-and paid-to handle these casesi'' Publicly appointed
private lawyers cost more, and, as discussed above, whether they
provide the same level of service is questionable."
Indigent defense lawyers may have limited, or no, resources to
investigate a case or appoint an expert. In the context of plea
bargaining, these limitations create a perfect storm that encourages
high plea rates, discourages negotiation, and contributes to many
defendants feeling that they are simply getting processed through the
system, but are not receiving individualized attention or justice.
These combined realities are serious structural problems facing the
criminal defense bar that make it difficult to reform plea bargaining
without providing more resources. Simply mandating that defense
lawyers do better without increased resources is unlikely to have
much impact.
B. Prosecutorial Power Structures
Prosecutorial Power Structures refer to the extraordinary powers
that prosecutors enjoy. These play a significant role in plea
bargaining by putting pressure on defendants to accept plea deals.
The Prosecutorial Power Structure is due, in large part, to the
punitive laws and practices built into our legal system.'37 Prosecutors
have virtually unchecked discretion to charge more- or less-serious
penalties for the same act."' They can also penalize defendants who
refuse plea offers by adding enhancements or charges-potentially
adding significant amounts of time that a defendant will spend in
custody if convicted."' Furthermore, because prosecutors are rarely
134. Denny Welsh, Federal Public Defender in Sacramento Decries Budget Cuts,
SACRAMENTO BEE (July 26, 2013) (quoting figures that the cost per case is eleven percent
lower if the Federal Public Defender handles a case than if a private lawyer is appointed),
http://www.sacbee.com/2013/07/26/5597549/federal-public-defender-in-sacramento.html; Stein
& Reilly, supra note 123.
135. See supra Section II.A.1 and accompanying notes.
136. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
251-74 (2011) (discussing the development of punitive laws and practices and how plea
bargaining contributed to high incarceration rates); see also Albert-Goldberg, supra note
107, at 466-68 (examples from misdemeanor cases in Los Angeles County).
137. KAGAN, supra note 13, at 65-66.
138. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at 87 ("After the police arrest someone,
the prosecutor is in charge. Few rules constrain the exercise of his or her discretion."); see
also Section V.B and accompanying notes (discussion on power imbalances in plea
bargaining).
139. This unchecked power creates serious power imbalances in the negotiation
process. See infra Section V.B. and discussion supra Section II regarding the lack of limits
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hesitant to wield this power, they contribute to the United States'
high incarceration rates and to the reality that first-time offenders are
regularly sentenced to time in custody even for nonviolent,
nonserious offenses. 40
The punitive nature of our criminal justice system results in the
incarceration of more people-both in raw numbers and in overall
incarceration rates-than in any other country. In 2011, the United
States incarcerated 2.2 million people.14' By comparison, China
incarcerates a total of 1.64 million people. 42 Our closest neighbors,
Canada 43 and Mexico,'" have substantially lower incarceration rates
than the United States. Even Russia's incarceration rate is one third
lower than ours."' In a speech to the American Bar Association, U.S.
Attorney General Eric Holder outlined the Department of Justice's
new "Smart on Crime" approach, stating that "widespread
incarceration at the federal, state, and local levels is both ineffective
and unsustainable." 46 Incarceration rates are not spread evenly
between communities or groups in the United States. African
Americans and Latinos have significantly higher incarceration rates.
that the Supreme Court has placed on prosecutors who threaten to add charges or
enhancements onto sentences in the plea bargaining process.
140. Of all federal offenders convicted of a felony or class A misdemeanor, 89.8%
were sentenced to prison time. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, Overview of Federal Criminal
Cases: Fiscal year 2011 3 (2012) http://www.ussc.gov/Research andStatistics/Research_
Publications/2012/FY11_OverviewFederalCriminalCases.pdf.
141. THE INT'L CIR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, World Prison Brief, available at
http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb-stats.php?area=all&category=wb-popto
tal (last visited Mar. 7, 2014) [hereinafter World Prison Brief]; see also THE SENTENCING
PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/page.cfm?id=107(last visited Mar. 7,
2014). The incarceration rate in the United States is 716/100,000 people. Id.
142. World Prison Brief, supra note 141. There are concerns that the raw numbers
might be higher in China and that these numbers do not include all prisoners. Id. ("The
Deputy Procurator-General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate reported in 2009 that,
in addition to the sentenced prisoners, more than 650,000 were held in detention centres in
China. If this is still correct in April 2012 the total prison population in China is more than
2,300,000.").
143. 114/100,000. Id.
144. 209/100,000. Id.
145. 487/100,000. Id. These numbers represent a decrease in recent years. In 2007,
the rate was 613/100,000; and in 2010, the rate was 609/100,000. Id.
146. Attorney General Eric Holder, Remarks to the Annual Meeting of the American
Bar Association's House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/
speeches/2013/ag-speech-130812.html [hereinafter Holder's Speech to the ABA].
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147 Attorney General Holder acknowledged this fact when he
observed that "[w]e also must confront the reality that... people of
color often face harsher punishments than their peers .... This isn't
just unacceptable-it is shameful."'48
Due to concerns about incarceration rates, the Department of
Justice is rethinking its approach with respect to federal prosecutions,
and specifically recommends prosecutors file fewer cases'49 and seek
out non-incarceration sentences, with the specific goal of reducing
incarceration rates.5 o In reaching these conclusions, the Department
of Justice is clearly learning from developments at the state level.
The combined approach in many states of using alternatives to
imprisonment, such as drug courts, and changing how parole and
probation violations are handled, has directly contributed to the
decline of incarceration rates nationwide."' But, the decline is still
small compared to our overall incarceration rate and, so far, is not
enough to stop the United States from keeping its status as the stand-
out leader in world incarceration rates.15 2  In the context of plea
bargaining, the high incarceration rates nationwide mean that
criminal defendants must be aware that it is very possible they will
end up in prison if convicted, even on a first offense, unless they fall
147. The incarceration rate for Whites is 380/100,000, for African Americans is
2,207/100,000, and for Latinos is 966/100,000. Incarceration Rates by Race/Ethnicity, supra
note 24.
148. Holder's Speech to the ABA, supra note 146.
149. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Smart on Crime: Reforming the Criminal Justice System for
the 21st Century 2 (Aug. 2013) ("This necessarily will mean focusing resources on fewer but
the most significant cases, as opposed to fixating on the sheer volume of cases."), available at
http://www.justice.gov/ag/smart-on-crime.pdf [hereinafter Smart on Crime].
150. Id. at 3-4.
151. Much of the decline in 2010 was due to California reducing the number of parole
violators it sent to prison. Paul Guerino et al., Prisoners in 2010, DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS 6, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/plO
.pdf. The U.S. prison population declined by 0.3% in 2010; however, during that same
period the federal prison population increased by 0.8%. Id. at 1. The year 2011 was the
third consecutive year with a decrease in prison population in the U.S. Lauren E. Glaze &
Erika Parks, Correctional Populations in the United States, 2011, DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 1 (2012). Texas has
also seen a decrease in incarceration rates that is attributed, in part, to the increased use of
problem-solving courts, such as drug courts. Thomas Betar, Texas, California Among
States Seeing a Reduction in Incarceration Rates, DESERET NEWS (Aug. 20, 2012, 4:52
PM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865560966/Texas-California-among-states-seeing -
a-reduction-in-incarceration-rates.html?pg=all.
152. As Attorney General Holder observed, "Even though this country comprises just
5 percent of the world's population, we incarcerate almost a quarter of the world's
prisoners." Holder's Speech to the ABA, supra note 146.
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into a category of crime where there is a concentrated effort to use
non-incarceration sentences.15 High incarceration rates can mean
that defendants who are offered a plea deal that does not include
prison time find it difficult to consider the risk of prison time by
fighting their case and going to trial.154  Defendants should also be
aware of the high imprisonment rate for parole and probation
violations, and should exercise caution when accepting long
probationary terms, although they are often left with few options.
The United States has not always had such a high incarceration
rate. 15 The incarceration rate began to increase in the late 1970s, and
soared in the 1980s with the start of the War on Drugs and the War
on Crime."' The War on Drugs increased arrests, and, more
importantly, increased penalties,' marking the beginning of a full
range of changes in the structure of penal codes around the nation.5 '
Laws changed to allow higher sentences for already existing crimes.
Legislatures passed mandatory minimum sentences for a full range of
offenses.'6o This era marked the beginning of repeat offender
153. In the federal system, 34.4% of those in prison are first-time offenders sentenced
to time for nonviolent offenses, and 72.1% are serving for a nonviolent offense with no
history of a violent offense. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, The Federal Prison Population:
A Statistical Analysis, 1, available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc
.federalprisonpop.pdf. As stated above, these numbers may change as the Department of
Justice implements new rules and policies to support its "Smart on Crime" approach. See
supra notes 147-153 and accompanying text.
154. See infra Section V.C. for a discussion regarding the trial penalty and its impact on
plea bargaining.
155. See, e.g., THE JFA INSTITUTE, Unlocking America: Why and How to Reduce
America's Prison Population, at 4 (2007), available at http://www.jfa-associates.com/
publications/srs/UnlockingAmerica.pdf [hereinafter Unlocking America].
156. For historical perspective on the increasing incarceration rates, see ALEXANDER,
supra note 15, at 40-58; see also Steven B. Duke, Mass Imprisonment, Crime Rates, and the
Drug War: A Penological and Humanitarian Disgrace, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 17 (2009);
KAGAN, supra note 13, at 68-70. The War on Drugs hit African-American communities
particularly hard causing even higher incarceration rates for this population. See, e.g.,
Incarceration Rates by Race/Ethnicity, supra note 24. For a scathing critique of the War on
Drugs and the disproportionate impact of increased incarceration rates on African
Americans, see generally ALEXANDER, supra note 15. As William Stuntz observed,
"African American imprisonment rates came to exceed the rate at which Stalin's Soviet
Union incarcerated its citizens." STUNTZ, supra note 136, at 253.
157. See, e.g., Unlocking America, supra note 155, at 4.
158. See, e.g., KAGAN, supra note 13, at 70.
159. These changes went beyond increasing penalties in drug offenses. See, e.g., id. at
69-70.
160. See, e.g., id.
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enhancements, such as "three-strikes" laws.161 Zero-tolerance policies
such as "use a gun, go to prison" were also put into place.'62 Congress
and many state legislatures also adopted sentencing guidelines that
regulated and regularized sentences for defendants.6 1 In addition to
changing the penalties on existing laws, legislatures around the
country added more crimes into their penal codes.'"' The federal
government also substantially increased the number of federal
offenses, including a significant number of strict liability offenses,
which are even easier to prosecute.
The increase in penalties and enhancements, zero-tolerance
policies, and sentencing guidelines gave prosecutors tools, embedded
within the structure of the criminal justice system, to pressure
defendants to plead guilty during plea bargaining.'" For example,
161. Under California's three-strikes law, which passed in 1994, a defendant convicted
of a new felony charge with two prior serious or violent felony convictions was sentenced
to twenty-five years to life in prison. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (1999). In 2012,
Proposition 36 amended the law to make the twenty-five-to-life provision applicable only
if the new felony is serious or violent. For a description of the law's passage, see Emily
Bazelon, How California's Three-Strikes Law Struck Out, SLATE (Nov. 13, 2012, 2:43 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/jurisprudence/2012/11/california three-str
ikeslawvoterswanted toreform_the_state_s_harsh-law.html.
162. For an example of the impact of the 1999 mandatory gun enhancement on
Marissa Alexander, a defendant in Florida, see Mitch Stacy, Marissa Alexander Gets 20
Years For Firing Warning Shot, THE HUFFINGTON POST (May 19, 2012, 1:07 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/19/marissa-alexander-gets-20_n_1530035.html.
163. Twenty-one states have sentencing guidelines, see NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
State Sentencing Guidelines: Profiles and Continuum, 4 (July 2008), http://www.ncsc.org/-/
media/Microsites/Files/CSI/StateSentencingGuidelines.ashx. In U.S. v. Booker, the
Supreme Court held that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were not mandatory. 543 U.S.
220, 226 (2005). However, post-Booker, empirical studies report that the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines are still important with certain cases sentenced within the guideline ranges. See
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, Report on the Continuing Impact of the United States v. Booker
on Federal Sentencing, 5-6 (2012) ("The guidelines have remained the essential starting point
for all federal sentences and have continued to influence sentences significantly." However,
there are variations depending on the offense-drug cases continue to be sentenced pursuant
to the guidelines, while judges more frequently sentence child pornography and fraud cases
below the guideline range.). For a discussion of uniformity in the context of the system post-
Booker, see generally Michael M. O'Hear, The Myth of Uniformity, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 249
(2005).
164. For a discussion of the larger political context and how race influenced these
changes to penal codes around the country, see ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at 40-58.
165. See, e.g., Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Criminal Laws Proliferate, More
are Ensnared, WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748
703749504576172714184601654.html (quoting an ABA study reporting that "the amount
of individual citizen behavior now potentially subject to federal criminal control has
increased in astonishing proportions in the last few decades." This includes an increase in
strict liability offenses.).
166. STUNTZ, supra note 136, at 259.
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stiffer penalties pressured defendants to plead guilty because "the
punishment for the minor, nonviolent offense . . . is so unbelievably
severe."167 Structural changes in penal codes around the country gave
prosecutors more choices when deciding how to charge an offense
and what offers to make; these legislative changes have often been
made precisely to give prosecutors more "bargaining chips."'6' A
prosecutor can now routinely decide whether to charge the same act
as a misdemeanor or a felony; whether to add an enhancement (e.g.,
use of a firearm in the commission of the offense); whether to add a
prior conviction; or whether to allege the offense happened "in a
school zone" or another location that will increase the potential
punishment.'69  Adding charges, enhancements, or prior convictions
can substantially increase the severity of a sentence."o In the course
of plea negotiations, a prosecutor can agree to drop each time-adding
allegation or threaten to add more serious charges if the defendant
refuses to "take the deal." 7 ' Thus far, the Supreme Court has
consistently sanctioned these kind of hard-bargaining tactics as long
as the threatened penalty is one that could be exerted under the
law.172  The Court has not yet considered whether some of the
extraordinarily high sentences possible under enhanced penalty
schemes are a cause for concern, nor has it found such sentences to
violate the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.7 1
167. ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at 87.
168. Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 36, at 1128.
169. For a discussion of prosecutorial power and its impact on plea bargaining, see
Klein, supra note 12, at 2037-38.
170. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at 88 (discussing how prosecutors use their
discretionary power to "load up defendants with charges that carry extremely harsh
sentences in order to force them to plead guilty to lesser offenses . .. ").
171. See, e.g., id. Pressuring defendants to take deals is only one type of pressure.
Prosecutors also use their discretionary charging power to encourage defendants to testify
as cooperating witnesses. Id.
172. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357 (1978).
173. See generally Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of
Humane Punishment to Constitutional Discourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 111 (2007)
(criticizing the U.S. Supreme Court's failure to expand its Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence to look more critically at both the longer possible sentences and the
conditions of imprisonment).
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C. Legal Framework Structures
The Legal Framework Structures, for purposes of this discussion,
are limited to those surrounding plea bargaining as they impact
defendants, such as the right to discovery or the delineation of the
obligations of individual defense lawyers in the negotiation process.17 4
The Supreme Court has taken a narrow approach and has focused on
a few requirements, such as the guilty plea being "voluntary and
intelligent" and the defendant obtaining a competent lawyer. Thus
far, the Court has not taken an expansive view in defining
"intelligent"; in addition, the Court is only at the early stages of
defining "competent assistance of counsel" in the context of plea
bargaining. For purposes of this discussion, Legal Framework
Structures are those that the Court has recognized, or is likely to
recognize. As discussed below, it is likely within this category that
Lafler and Frye will have the largest impact."'
IV. Reasons for Plea Bargaining
There are four basic reasons plea bargaining exists: (1) it resolves
cases when there are no issues in dispute; (2) it is an efficient way to
handle cases; (3) it gives an incentive for cooperating witnesses; and
(4) it allows for more creativity in resolving criminal cases."' The first
reason-that there are no issues in dispute-means that the
defendant did what he is accused of and there are no legal issues to
litigate."' These cases are often factually fairly simple, making
174. See supra Section II.
175. See discussion infra Section VII.
176. Although not all four reasons are acknowledged in conversations regarding plea
bargaining, all are important because they impact how easily changes can be made to plea
bargaining or what type of changes might make sense to consider. For an example of a
fairly typical description of the pros and cons of plea bargaining that fails to acknowledge
at least one advantage the flexibility that plea bargaining provides, see e.g., Levenson,
supra note 16, at 16-21.
177. See, e.g., KAGAN, supra note 13, at 84 (observing that "guilty pleas often reflect
straightforward confessions by defendants caught dead to rights, and the ensuing sentence
reflects a 'going rate' well understood by the courthouse community"); see also Jerold H.
Israel, Excessive Criminal Justice Caseloads: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom, 48
FLA. L. REV. 761, 774 (1996) ("[M]any defendants may desire to enter a guilty plea, rather
than contest the charge, and would do so without regard to any extra incentives offered by
a prosecutor or court . . . ."); CANDICE MCCOY, POLITICS AND PLEA BARGAINING:
VICrIM's RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA 50-69 (1993); Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Cooperating
or Caving In: Are Defense Attorneys Shrewd or Exploited in Plea Bargaining
Negotiations?, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 145, 158 (2007) ("Prosecutors and defenders are
negotiating over relatively few contentious issues and are negotiating over the sentence at
the margins.") [hereinafter Cooperating or Caving In].
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scientific evidence and extensive investigation unnecessary.'78 If there
are no issues to litigate, the extended process of a trial is unnecessary.
On a practical level, the question in most criminal cases is not
whether the defendant committed the crime, but what is the fairest
way to handle the particular offense.179 Because the parties within the
criminal justice system recognize that this is the issue to be resolved in
most cases, they tend to resist efforts to force more "unnecessary"
trials, as attempts to ban plea bargaining have illustrated.""o
The second and most often cited reason for plea bargaining is the
efficient handling of cases."" Jury trials in the United States can take
considerable time and resources." Increasing the number of jury
trials by even twenty percent would carry significant costs, due to the
need for more courts, judges, and lawyers.m Although some
jurisdictions have experimented with abolishing plea bargaining, the
prevailing wisdom is that most busy jurisdictions do not have
sufficient resources or staffing to ban plea bargaining or even
significantly reduce its use.m Judges, prosecutors, and defense
178. For a list of the types of questions a defense attorney should ask in preparing for
plea bargaining, see generally HERMAN, supra note 29, at 1.
179. Plea bargaining arguably "protects" the system from the possibility of issuing a
"wrong verdict." FISHER, supra note 6, at 178. It also removes from the system those
cases where "the defendant faces the clearest evidence of guilt." Id. at 179. Albert
Alschuler argued that "[t]his approach to plea bargaining plainly regards the process
primarily as a form of dispute resolution rather than as a sentencing device." Albert
Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 652, 684 (1981).
Alschuler maintains that plea bargaining is "designed to compromise an unresolved
dispute between the defendant and the state," not that plea bargaining arises out of the
lack of a factual dispute, and is often reduced to a discussion (or dispute) about the
sentence. Id. Alschuler is concerned about innocent defendants and when the state does
not have enough evidence to support a conviction. Id. at 684-87. For more discussion of
"the innocence problem" see infra Section IV.C. and accompanying notes.
180. See, e.g., Guidorizzi, supra note 17, at 772-79 (describing various examples of
partial and complete plea bargaining bans); Wright & Miller, supra note 19, at 43-48
(describing plea bargaining bans in Alaska, and other jurisdictions, such as El Paso,
Texas).
181. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970); Albert W. Alschuler,
Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 33-35 (1979). George Fisher
argues that "caseload pressure" is not the only reason for the rise of plea bargaining in the
United States. See generally FISHER, supra note 6, at 6-11 (2003).
182. For an argument about the importance of jury trials and criticizing their
disappearance, see generally Young, supra note 18.
183. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971); John Kaplan,
American Merchandising and the Guilty Plea: Replacing the Bazaar with the Department
Store, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 215, 220 (1977).
184. See, e.g., Scott W. Howe, The Value of Plea Bargaining, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 599,
609-15 (2005); Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Should We Really "Ban" Plea Bargaining?: The
attorneys all rely on plea bargaining to manage their caseloads.
These "insiders"" consider plea bargaining to be an indispensable
part of how they do their jobs and manage work-life balance. As
such, they would strongly resist plea bargaining reform if it were to
slow down or reduce plea bargaining (and thereby interfere with
caseload management). Prosecutors, in particular, would resist plea
bargaining reform if such changes were thought to undermine their
power in the system which, in part, enables them to exercise control
over their caseloads.' The Supreme Court also recognizes that our
criminal justice system depends on plea bargaining to function."' This
may be one reason why the Court has, for the most part, allowed
"business as usual" and has not yet required a major overhaul of plea
bargaining.""
The third reason for plea bargaining, usually offered by
prosecutors and law enforcement, is that offering plea deals to
cooperating witnesses is an important tool in complex prosecutions.
For example, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines allow for a "sentence
departure" for cooperating witnesses, and a significant number of
Core Concerns of Plea Bargaining Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 774-79 (1998). For a more
detailed discussion of one example, see generally Roland Acevedo, Is a Ban on Plea
Bargaining an Ethical Abuse of Discretion? A Bronx County, New York Case Study, 64
FORDHAM L. REv. 987 (1995). One study concluded that the trial rate is not related to
the caseload, but to other factors; local legal culture influences the rate of guilty pleas. See
generally THOMAS W. CHURCH, JR., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, EXAMINING LOCAL LEGAL
CULTURE: PRACTITIONER ATTITUDES IN FOUR CRIMINAL COURTS (1982) (based on a
study of the Bronx, Miami, Pittsburgh, and Detroit). Some have concluded that banning
plea bargaining would not stop the practice of guilty pleas and that defendants would
simply negotiate directly with the judge, thereby creating a system that is even more
secretive. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 183, at 219-20.
185. For a discussion of who are the insiders and outsiders, and how the insiders are able
to "work the system," see MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 29-58.
186. See infra Section V.B. for a discussion of power imbalances in plea bargaining.
Historically, plea bargaining rose to prominence due to insider support. FISHER, supra
note 6, at 11 ("Any institution that holds the affection of both of the system's major
players will amass a staying power of its own. Hence plea bargaining has not merely
endured, but has grown to be the dominant institution of American criminal justice.").
187. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) ("Whatever might be the situation
in an ideal world, the fact is that the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are
important components of this country's criminal justice system.").
188. See discussion supra Section II.
189. See, e.g., Benjamin B. Wagoner & Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Retooling Law
Enforcement to Investigate and Prosecute Entrenched Corruption: Key Criminal Procedure
Reforms for Indonesia and Other Nations, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 183, 217 (2008) ("[T]he
standard approach is to start near the bottom of the organization and work up the chain of
command ... lower level participants are 'flipped' or 'rolled' to provide evidence against
higher level participants in the scheme.").
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defendants in the federal system take advantage of this.'" Organized
crime prosecutions often depend on arresting and "flipping" lower-
level players to prosecute the leaders.19' Prosecutors also regularly
use cooperating witnesses to build corruption and drug trafficking
cases.'" Federal prosecutors tend to see this kind of deal-making as a
necessary crime-fighting tool.'93 Critics dismiss the use of informants
as "notoriously unreliable," especially when done in exchange for a
better deal.94 However, for many prosecutors, not having this option
would impact their ability (or at least their perceived ability) to put
together the more difficult cases.
The fourth reason for plea bargaining is rarely stated, but is
perhaps the most valuable: It allows for flexibility and creativity in a
system that rarely fosters either."' Thanks to plea bargaining, the
criminal justice system can experiment, innovate, and take alternative
approaches. This means that practices in the criminal justice system
190. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 5K1.1 (2012). One third of plea agreements in the
federal system of the District of Columbia include an agreement to cooperate. Mary
Patrice Brown & Stevan E. Bunnell, Negotiating Justice: Prosecutorial Perspectives on
Federal Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1063, 1072
(2006).
191. See, e.g., Brown & Bunnell, supra note 190, at 1073 ("Cooperation agreements
are critically important to law enforcement.").
192. See, e.g., Wagoner & Jacobs, supra note 189, at 217.
193. See, e.g., JENIA I. TURNER, PLEA BARGAINING ACROSS BORDERS 34 (2009).
Scholars and practitioners recognize the value of this tool in the fight against serious crime
in post-conflict environments. COMBATING SERIOUS CRIMES IN POST CONFLICT
SOCIETIES: A HANDBOOK FOR POLICYMAKERS AND PRACTITIONERS 61-63 (Colette
Rausch ed., 2006) (noting that "[i]mmunity from prosecution and mitigation of sentences
have become useful tools in the fight against serious crimes").
194. ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at 88.
195. The recent Department of Justice Memorandum calling for changes in how low-
level, non-violent drug offenses are handled still clings to the importance of getting
information from defendants and states, "[i]n determining the appropriate sentence to
recommend to the Court, prosecutors should consider whether the defendant truthfully and
in a timely way provided to the Government all information the defendant has concerning
the offense, or offenses, that were part of the same court of conduct, common scheme, or
plan." Memorandum from Eric Holder, Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Department
Policy on Charging Mandatory Minimum Sentences and Recidivist Enhancements in Certain
Drug Cases 3 (Aug. 12, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/docs/ag-memo-
department-policypon-charging-mandatory-minimum-sentences-recidivist-enhancements-in-
certain-drugcases.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum on Charging in Drug Cases].
196. The federal system is arguably the least creative or flexible, and still does not use
much in the way of creative sentencing. For example, 89.8% of all federal offenders
convicted of a felony or class A misdemeanor were sentenced to prison time. U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, Overview of Federal Criminal Cases Fiscal year 2011, at 3 (2012),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/ResearchandStatistics/ResearchPublications/2012/
FY11_OverviewFederalCriminalCases.pdf.
Spring 2014] 591
can change without having to draft and enact legislation. To try a
new approach within the criminal justice system, all that is needed is
for the professionals in the system to agree. The best example is the
development of problem-solving courts, such as drug courts, veterans
courts, and mental health courts." These courts started because
professionals in the system, often judges, pushed to try new
approaches due to their concern that the existing system was
198inadequate.
Problem-solving courts are a combination of counseling and
punishment.'" The first drug court was established in Dade County,
Florida, in 1998; it arose out of frustration with the traditional
criminal justice system's response to widespread drug addiction,
expressed by several judges, prosecutors, and the public defender.200
Drug courts are probably the fastest-growing alternative form of
dispute resolution within the criminal justice system.20 Some states
passed legislation for the creation and use of drug courts after such
courts had already been in use. 22 For example, in 2001, Texas
required drug courts for all jurisdictions with a population over
550,000.203 That requirement was expanded in 2007, and Texas
currently requires any county with a population over 200,000 to have
197. Drug courts, however, are criticized. See, e.g., NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIMINAL DEF.
LAWYERS, America's Problem-Solving Courts: The Criminal Costs of Treatment and the
Case for Reform (Sept. 2009), http://www.nacdl.org/drugcourts/ (criticizing the approach of
drug courts in continuing the criminalization of drug addiction rather than treating
addiction as a public health problem).
198. JAMES L. NOLAN JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT
MOVEMENT 39(2001) [hereinafter REINVENTING JUSTICE].
199. For a description of these various courts, see, e.g., JAMES L. NOLAN JR., LEGAL
ACCENTS, LEGAL BORROWING: THE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT
MOVEMENT 7-22 (2009) [hereinafter LEGAL ACCENTS, LEGAL BORROWING].
200. REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 198, at 39. For a discussion of how judges'
job dissatisfaction has influenced the creation of these courts, see LEGAL ACCENTS,
LEGAL BORROWING, supra note 199, at 8-9.
201. As of 2011, there were at least 2,600 drug courts nationwide. See NAT'L INST. OF
JUSTICE, Drug Courts, http://www.nij.gov/topics/courts/drug-courts/Pages/welcome.aspx
(last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
202. After drug courts are established, state legislation helps to institutionalize drug
courts into the overall criminal justice system by, for example, securing reliable state funding.
For examples of states that have taken this approach, see, e.g., Dennis A. Reilly & Atoundra
Pierre-Lawson, Ensuring Sustainability for Drug Courts: An Overview of Funding Strategies,
NATIONAL DRUG COURT INSTITUTE, Monograph Series 8 at 5-8 (Apr. 2008), available at
http://www.ndci.org/sites/default/files/ndci/Mono8.Sustainability.pdf.
203. H.B. 1287, 77th Leg. (Tex. 2001).
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a drug court.2 4 These types of laws, however, are not necessary to
establish drug courts or other problem-solving courts. Due to the
flexibility in plea bargaining, all that is required to impose a
punishment other than jail, imprisonment, or a fine is for a judge,
prosecutor, and defendant to agree-through a plea bargain-to
resolve the case through an alternative process.20 This may be more
complicated in systems with sentencing guidelines or with charges
that carry mandatory minimums; this may explain, in part, why there
is relatively little creative sentencing in the federal system and more
innovative plea bargains at the local level.2 6
The flexibility that plea bargaining allows is perhaps even more
important when considering the circumstances of many, if not most,
defendants. Drug use is the norm, not the exception, for
defendants.207 Mental illness is also common and often untreated.20s
The use of problem-solving courts may contribute to decreasing
imprisonment rates.2" High imprisonment rates, as the next section
explains, are one of the basic realities defendants confront in making
decisions about plea deals. 21 0 The flexibility of plea bargaining allows
204. H.B. 530, 80th Leg. (Tex. 2007) (this requirement is contingent on the availability
of state or federal funding).
205. For a description of why many professionals within the criminal justice system
were ready to try a new approach, see REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 198, at 44-46.
206. The federal system is starting to change. See supra Section IV.B., notes 150-155
and accompanying text. For an example of a newer problem-solving court at the federal
level, see Jill Cowan, Alternative Program Gives Federal Defendants a Second Chance, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 22, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/oct/22/local/la-me-casa-20131022.
207. Steven Belenko, The Challenges of Integrating Drug Treatment into the Criminal
Justice Process, 63 ALB. L. REV. 833, 835 (2000). For example, in one New York study,
seventy-seven percent of men arrested and eighty-two percent of women tested positive
for illegal drug use at the time of their arrest. Id.
208. Up to one-third of prison and jail inmates in a recent study reported that they
have received counseling or therapy for "manic depression, bipolar disorder, or other
depressive disorder, schizophrenia or another psychotic disorder, post-traumatic stress
disorder, or an anxiety or other personality disorder." Allen J. Beck & Christopher Krebs,
Sexual Victimization in Prisons and Jails Reported by Inmates, 2011-12, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 24 (2013),
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/svpjri1112.pdf.
209. Decreased incarceration rates may be due both to sending fewer people to prison
who are convicted and to reduced recidivism rates among those who get drug treatment.
See, e.g., JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, Substance Abuse Treatment and Public Safety, at 6-
10 (Jan. 2008), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/0801_rep-drugtx-
ac-ps.pdf.
210. This is not to suggest that these courts are above criticism. For one interesting
critical analysis, see NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, America's Problem
Solving Courts: The Criminal Costs of Treatment and the Case for Reform (2009),
http://www.nacdl.org/drugcourts/ (expressing concern, in part, that the most seriously
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system insiders to change how individual cases or categories of cases
are handled without having to wait for a shift in public opinion or the
legislative process. As the drug court example illustrates, this
flexibility often allows for experimentation-which may demonstrate
why a different approach might make sense-which in turn leads to
legislative changes that formalize the new approach within the legal
system. Innovative programs may also lead to intra- and extra-
jurisdictional changes in prosecutorial policies. For example, in
August 2013 Attorney General Holder announced an intention to
substantially move away from incarceration and look towards
alternatives. In announcing this change, Attorney General Holder
specifically pointed to the experience of individual states, including
Texas, which have "successfully implemented drug treatment
programs" and to a few limited treatment programs that already exist
in the federal system.212
V. The Negotiation Atmosphere for Plea Bargaining
The Supreme Court has not yet recognized the serious impact
that the realities discussed above regularly have on the fundamental
fairness of the plea bargaining negotiation atmosphere. The Court
has also failed to analyze the negotiation process itself and the factors
in individual negotiations that may impact the fairness of the process.
Instead, the Court's statements indicate the limits of what it sees in
terms of how plea bargaining works. For example, in an earlier era,
the Court expressed that the defense and prosecution "arguably
possess relatively equal bargaining power." 213 Eight years later, the
Court, in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, stated that "[d]efendants advised
by competent counsel and protected by other procedural safeguards
are presumptively capable of intelligent choice in response to
prosecutorial persuasion, and unlikely to be driven to false self-
condemnation." 214  The Court's view, so far, seems to be that
sufficient procedural protections and competent defense lawyers are
all that is needed to protect the fairness of the plea bargaining
addicted people are not getting into these courts, but are instead being used by first-time
offenders or those who do not have the most serious addiction problems).
211. Holder's Speech to the ABA, supra note 146.
212. Id. at 4.
213. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809 (1970). This opinion predates the
changes in legislation giving prosecutors more power in charging and plea bargaining, and
predates the dramatic increase in incarceration rates nationwide.
214. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978).
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process. In contrast to the Court's almost idyllic view of how the
criminal justice system operates, the popular view of the criminal
justice system is that it is an emotion-filled battleground where
prosecutors and defense lawyers hate each other and fight
passionately to win their cases, often at any cost and regardless of the
rules.215 The reality is far less dramatic, and, in most cases, far less
adversarial.216
As has been discussed, the criminal justice system relies on plea
bargaining, and plea bargaining often relies on solid working
relationships-often mutually beneficial and interdependent-
between the professionals in the system.217 However, this does not
mean that it is a relationship between equals. The only power the
defendant has in a plea negotiation is the threat to go forward with a
trial, which often works to the defendant's own disadvantage. 218 The
prosecutor has far greater power in the plea negotiation.219
As this section will discuss, there are six basic factors in the
negotiation process itself that should be considered in analyzing the
plea bargaining atmosphere. These factors are important in
determining whether the process meets a basic level of fundamental
fairness. The first factor is whether plea bargaining can be
categorized as highly cooperative or adversarial. The second is how
the serious power imbalances influence plea bargaining. The third
factor is that innocent defendants plead guilty. The fourth is the trial
penalty, which virtually every defendant faces. The fifth is whether,
in negotiation terms, there is a best alternative to a negotiated
agreement ("BATNA") in the context of plea bargaining. The sixth
is how the interests of the players in plea bargaining impact the
negotiation atmosphere.
A. Cooperative or Adversarial?
The main players in plea bargaining-the prosecutor and defense
lawyer-often have longstanding working relationships. They often
215. See, e.g., Richard Birke, The Role of Trial in Promoting Cooperative Negotiation
in Criminal Practice, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 39, 67 (2007).
216. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial
Reforms, 126 HARV. L. REV. 150 (2012) [hereinafter Incompetent Plea Bargaining].
217. Id. at 164.
218. See discussion infra Section V.C.
219. Critics of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines argue that the Guidelines give
prosecutors disproportionate power due to the critical nature of the charging decisions.
See, e.g., Joseph S. Hall, Rule 11(E)(1)(C) and the Sentencing Guidelines: Bargaining
Outside the Heartland?, 87 IOWA L. REV. 587, 590 (2002).
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work with each other in the same courtrooms for years. The working
atmosphere is generally one of mutual dependency where each
depends on the other to move the cases along and keep the workload
manageable. But, does this mutual dependency mean that plea
bargaining is a cooperative form of negotiation?
Andrea Kupfer Schneider studied lawyer negotiating styles
across seven different practice groups and found that criminal
practitioners had the highest rate of true "problem solvers"
(49.2%).220 Interestingly, in Schneider's study, 68.2% of defense
attorneys were rated as true problem solvers, compared to 38.2% for
prosecutors. 221  A problem-solving lawyer is one who works with
counterparts to try to satisfy the client's interests, and tends to be
more collaborative and less adversarial because of the tendency to see
the possibility of "expanding the pie" and having "win-win"
solutions.222 In contrast, an adversarial negotiator is one who sees
negotiation as a zero-sum game and thinks that gains by one side
must be at the expense of the other.223 Since criminal lawyers tend to
work so closely together, are mutually dependent, and tend to have a
high number of repeat players, it is not surprising that there are high
levels of cooperation and "problem solving" embedded into the
average criminal court. 224 The relatively high rates of problem solvers
among criminal practitioners may also explain the quick growth of
problem-solving courts, as this alternative approach seems to fit the
already existing attitudes of practitioners in the criminal justice
system.
However, this does not mean that plea bargaining can be easily
defined as a cooperative form of negotiation.225 Plea bargaining is
220. Cooperating or Caving In, supra note 177, at 151. The seven practice groups were
corporate, criminal, property, civil, commercial, family, and other. Id. at 151-52. For
more information on the original study, see generally Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering
Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 143 (2002).
221. Cooperating or Caving In, supra note 177, at 155. However, "the numbers in this
part of the study were very limited . . . ." Thus, it would be interesting for another study to
focus on this distinction between defense lawyers' and prosecutors' problem-solving styles
to see if the results hold true with a larger sample size. Id. at 156.
222. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 794-801 (1984).
223. Id. at 764-65, 783-89 ("It is assumed the parties must be in conflict and since they
are presumed to be bargaining for the same 'scarce' items, negotiators assume that any
solution is predicated upon division of the goods.").
224. Cooperating or Caving In, supra note 177, at 156-58.
225. HERMAN, supra note 29, at 1-4.
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often viewed by the parties as a zero-sum game with a focus
exclusively on the length of the sentence a defendant will receive,
particularly in more serious cases.226 Hard-bargaining tactics are
common in plea negotiations. Prosecutors regularly state that an
offer is a "take it or leave it" offer and that "it won't get any better."227
It is also common to put time limits on an offer 2 -Such was the case
in Frye-so that if the offer is not accepted in a time period, it will
expire.229 "Exploding offers" are also common, as prosecutors will
regularly say, "If your client doesn't take this deal today, I will add
that prior and he will be looking at double the time." 230 These are not
idle threats. They are effective high-pressure tactics that prosecutors
regularly employ to coerce defendants to plead guilty. 23' Defense
lawyers know, and regularly explain to their clients, that these threats
are not considered to be coercion and that if they plead guilty in
response to such a threat, the courts will view the guilty plea as
voluntary.232 As Russell Covey observed, "[t]he routine use of high
pressure bargaining tactics and exploding offers . . . places added
psychological stress on criminal defendants." 233 Because prosecutors
regularly use such threats, it is difficult to define plea bargaining as
cooperative. Plea bargaining may sometimes be a cooperative
negotiation; at other times, it may be highly adversarial.
226. And, at times even more extreme punishments, such as the death penalty, are
used to pressure defendants to accept life sentences. As William Stuntz observed,
"[c]apital punishment's largest consequence is not the few dozen executions that happen
each year in the United States but the many life sentences imposed after plea bargains
designed to avoid death sentences." STUNTZ, supra note 136, at 260.
227. This can be even more pronounced in more serious cases. In one study of plea
bargaining in death penalty cases, prosecutors reported that "there was no negotiation
over a plea in death-eligible cases; a plea bargain, if offered, was presented as 'take it or
leave it."' Susan Ehrhard, Plea Bargaining and the Death Penalty: An Exploratory Study,
29 JUST. Sys. J. 313, 320 (2008).
228. See, e.g., HERMAN, supra note 29, at 66.
229. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404-05 (2012).
230. The threats are not limited to the defendant themselves. Defendants are told
that if they do not take the deal their spouses or their parents or other family members
will be threatened with prosecution. An example was when prosecutors threatened
Jonathan Pollard-who was convicted of spying for Israel-that if he did not plead guilty
his wife would face charges. STUNTz, supra note 136, at 260.
231. Plea-Bargaining Law, supra note 27, at 242 (2007).
232. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). "Every defense
attorney (and prosecutor) can tell stories of defendants forced to decide virtually on the
spot, or within absurdly short time limits, whether to accept or reject a plea offer with
consequences measured in years or decades." Plea-Bargaining Law, supra note 27, at 242.
233. Id. at 243.
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Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has, so far, failed to examine how
these differences might impact the fundamental fairness of the
process.
B. Power Imbalances
A regular concern in analyzing dispute resolution processes is to
examine whether there is a power imbalance, and if so, how serious
that imbalance might be.234 If there is a serious power imbalance, it
could be inappropriate to use an informal dispute resolution process
because the less powerful party may feel pressured into accepting a
deal that is not in his interest."' In the context of plea bargaining,
power imbalances are built into the structure of the system. 3
Prosecutors decide what charges to file. As discussed above, given
the current structure of penal codes, this is no small exercise of
discretion and one that has a defining impact on each case."' In
addition, prosecutors can decide, almost without limit, to add
additional charges or enhancements after the case has been filed, as
long as the additions are at least arguably supported by the
evidence." Moreover, the more mandatory minimums or sentencing
enhancements built into the structure of the code, the more power the
234. See, e.g., Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath:
Dealing with Power Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2000);
Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139 (2005).
235. There is extensive debate in dispute resolution scholarship on power imbalances
and whether informal processes such as negotiation and mediation are appropriate,
particularly when dealing with gender-based discrimination, racial discrimination and
crimes of violence against women. See generally Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly:
Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441 (1992); Richard
Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 1985 WiS. L. REV. 1359 (1985); Trina Grillo, The Mediation
Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991); Joshua D.
Rosenberg, In Defense of Mediation, 33 ARIz. L. REV. 467 (1991).
236. See, e.g., O'Hear, supra note 19, at 425.
237. See supra Section III.B and accompanying notes. Prosecutorial discretion is built
into our system. See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969). This Article does not advocate ending prosecutorial
discretion. As Davis observed, "to fix as the goal the elimination of all discretion on all
subjects would be utter insanity." Id. at 43. Discretion has its place and when exercised
properly can lead to a better justice system. But, as Davis also said, the goal should be "to
eliminate unnecessary discretionary power, not to eliminate all discretionary power." Id.
at 217.
238. Overcharging is not necessarily a violation and is routine in many jurisdictions. It
is a practice that has been criticized by many. For example, Wright & Miller commented
that "[a] particularly noxious form of dishonesty is overcharging by prosecutors-the filing
of charges with the expectation that defendants will trade excess charges for a guilty plea."
Wright & Miller, supra note 19, at 33.
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prosecutor holds." Prosecutors also have the power to decide not to
make a plea offer. In effect, the prosecutors hold all the cards;
defendants only have the power to throw a monkey wrench into the
system by demanding a jury trial.
In 2013, the Supreme Court decided the case of United States v.
Davila.2" As stated earlier, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure states that judges cannot "participate" in plea negotiation
discussions. 241' The Court in Davila held that there was a Rule 11
violation because the judge (here, a United States magistrate judge)
directly addressed the defendant about the plea bargain; the
violation, however, was not enough to vacate the guilty plea.242 For
this discussion, the magistrate's statement is relevant because it nicely
sums up the situation that so many defendants find themselves in
when deciding whether to accept a plea deal. The magistrate
recommended that the defendant plead guilty rather than "wasting
the Court's time, [and] causing the Government to have to spend a
bunch of money empanelling a jury to try an open and shut case."2 43
The magistrate went on to tell Mr. Davila that:
[T]he Government, they have all of the marbles in this
situation . . . . That means you've got to go to the
cross. You've got to tell the probation officer
everything you did in this case regardless of how bad it
makes you appear to be because that is the way you
get that three-level reduction for acceptance, and
believe me, Mr. Davila, someone with your criminal
history needs a three-level reduction for acceptance.2"
This is the situation for most defendants: the government has "all of
the marbles" and the only defense option is "to go to the cross" and
accept the plea deal, or proceed to trial at their peril.
239. Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance in a
Criminal Code on Charging, Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1935, 1943
(2006).
240. United States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139 (2013).
241. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1). This is not the rule in every state. See, e.g., Cynthia
Alkon, Plea Bargaining Harmless Error, ADR PROF BLOG (June 16, 2013),
www.indisputably.org/?p=4735.
242. Davila, 133 S. Ct. at 2150.
243. Id. at 2144.
244. Id.
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A defendant's custody status is another aspect of the power
imbalance present in many plea negotiations. This is more of an issue
in felony cases, where up to two-thirds or more of felony defendants
are held in pretrial custody.245 Psychologically, a guilty plea by an in-
custody defendant is fundamentally different than a guilty plea by an
out-of-custody defendant.246 When a defendant is out of custody, he
can suffer loss aversion247 when contemplating a plea that will involve
giving up his freedom and going to jail or prison.2" By contrast, when
a defendant is in custody, and particularly if the offer is "time
served," taking the deal may seem like a "win." 24 9
The process costs to defendants-both in and out of custody-of
coming to court is another aspect of the power imbalance. For the
prosecutor and probably for the defense lawyer, being in court is their
job. For the defendant, it can be a miserable experience. If the
defendant is in custody, as Covey described:
[D]efendants are rousted from their cells before
sunrise and transported to the 'bullpens'-crowded,
dirty, and dangerous holding cells adjoining the
courthouse-where they spend entire days waiting for
a visit with a lawyer that may last as little as a few
seconds, and an equally short-or shorter-
appearance before a judge that inevitably ends with
the grant of yet another continuance . . . Following
their court appearance, defendants then return to the
bullpens only to spend several more hours subjected to
the same miserable conditions before finally being
returned to their cells, hungry and often too late for
dinner.
The conditions on court days for in-custody defendants are such
that it "reframes the decision to plead guilty" because it allows
245. Plea-Bargaining Law, supra note 27, at 239.
246. Id. at 239-40.
247. Under loss aversion theory, people tend to try to avoid doing anything that will
result in a loss. If a defendant is out of custody, any sentence that includes going into
custody may feel like a loss (as it is a loss of freedom). For additional discussion of loss
aversion in the context of plea bargaining, see, e.g., Cooperating or Caving In, supra note
177, at 160.
248. Plea-Bargaining Law, supra note 27, at 239.
249. Id. at 239-40.
250. Id. at 241.
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defendants to "end an interminable . . . process.""' And, a day in
court is not fun for the out-of-custody defendant either as they must
face "[tiedious lines to get through courthouse security, interminable
waiting for cases to be called, strict limitations on what can be
brought into the courtroom (e.g., no food, no reading materials) and
seemingly endless continuances" that require days off from work,
arranging childeare, and transportation to the courthouse.252
Misdemeanor defendants also face high process costs if they do not
take the plea offer. In his study of cases in lower-level criminal
courts, Malcolm Feeley observed, "[i]ronically, the cost of invoking
one's rights is frequently greater than the loss of the rights
themselves, which is why so many defendants accept a guilty plea
without a battle."253 In addition, when considering the "loss" of a
guilty plea, Feeley points out that "fear of arrest and conviction does
not loom as large in the eyes of many people brought into court as it
does in the eyes of middle-class researchers."2 54 Pleading guilty is
often "the best way to minimize punishment" 25 in those
circumstances.
C. The Innocent Defendant
Reflecting the overall negotiation atmosphere is the reality that
innocent people have pled guilty to offenses they did not commit. Of
the 311 DNA exonerations in the United States, twenty-nine plead
guilty.256 The National Registry of Exonerations, which includes both
DNA and non-DNA exonerations, calculated that eight percent of
exonerated defendants pled guilty.257 However, as the report states,
this figure is probably low as there are so few exonerations and many
are for more serious crimes. There are procedural hurdles to
exonerations, including appeal waivers and the lack of a trial record.5
251. Id. at 242.
252. Id. at 240-41.
253. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES
IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 277 (1992).
254. Id. at 200.
255. Plea-Bargaining Law, supra note 27, at 241.
256. INNOCENCE PROJECT, When the Innocent Plead Guilty, http://www.
innocenceproject.org/Content/When-theInnocentPleadGuilty.php (last visited Mar. 7,
2014).
257. Samuel R. Gross & Michael Shaffer, Exonerations in the United States, 1989-
2012, NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS 16 (June 2012), available at http://www.law.
umich.edu/speciallexoneration/Documents/exonerations-us_1989_2012_fullreport.pdf.
258. Id. at 16-17.
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Together, this makes it difficult to calculate how commonly innocent
defendants plead guilty to less-serious offenses.' Russell Covey's
research on group exonerations from the Rampart and Tulia scandals
found considerably higher guilty plea rates: eighty-one percent of
defendants later exonerated in those scandals entered guilty pleas.26
Covey concludes that police misconduct, the primary cause of
wrongful convictions in these cases, is a "major source of wrongful
convictions.""' Covey suggests that the high guilty plea rates in these
larger scandals indicate that the "potential magnitude of the wrongful
conviction problem is many times greater" than the earlier DNA
exoneration cases suggested with their lower conviction rates due to
guilty pleas."'
In addition to the statistics regarding the percentage of
exonerated who plead guilty, there is also an interesting empirical
study suggesting that it might be common for an innocent person to
decide to plead guilty, due to fear of the consequences.263 In this
study, college students were put into different groups and accused of
cheating.2 6 In this controlled experiment, some had "cheated" and
some were "innocent." 26 5  The "innocent" students took the
259. Id.
260. Russell Covey, Police Misconduct as Cause of Wrongful Convictions, 90 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1133, 1163 (2013). The Rampart scandal happened in Los Angeles in the late
1990s. The misconduct of police officers out of the Rampart division of the Los Angeles
Police Department was "police corruption on an unimagined scale implicating police
officers in wrongful killings, indiscriminate beatings and violence, theft, and drug dealing."
Id. at 1138. In total, 156 felony convictions were overturned or dismissed. Id. The scandal
in Tulia, Texas, also in the late 1990s, was due to the testimony of one "freelance agent"
who accused forty-seven people of selling cocaine. Id. at 1139. Forty-seven people were
charged in these cases, with twenty-five convictions and number of the rest receiving
deferred adjudication. Id. at 1140. The convictions, some through trial and the rest
through plea bargaining, were later vacated and the state agreed to a settlement of
$250,000 to be divided among the defendants. Id.
261. Id. at 1185.
262. Id. at 1162.
263. Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent Defendant's Dilemma: An
Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining's Innocence Problem, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3-4 (2013).
264. Id. at 28-29.
265. The study participants thought they were participating in an experiment in
completing logic problems. They were given problems to answer and were instructed to
not help any other test taker. In one group, fellow "participants," who were actually just
posing as participants and actually part of the experiment, asked the participants questions
about the problems. In this group, virtually all of the students answered or responded in
some way, which was a clear violation of the rules. These were the "guilty" students. In
the other group, everyone remained silent and there was no violation of the rules. This
was the "innocent" group. Id. at 29-36.
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equivalent of the "deal" to avoid more serious disciplinary
proceedings that could have had lasting consequences on their college
careers.2" The clear implication is that innocent people will fear the
consequences and be as likely (if not more likely) to take deals.'6 As
will be discussed below, there are serious consequences in terms of
trial penalties for defendants who do not accept plea deals.268 This
may make it more likely that innocent defendants will feel the
pressure and decide to plead guilty. This may be more likely when
they are charged with offenses that carry serious potential penalties,
making the pressure to accept a deal even more attractive.
In examining the cases of the exonerated who plead guilty,
Covey suggests that there are three "important reasons" that
innocent defendants plead guilty: (1) "because the evidence they
expect the state to offer at trial . . . would likely be compelling to
neutral jurors and judges;" 269 (2) "the offer is too good to refuse[,]"
which is closely tied to the high potential penalties in cases;270 and (3)
defendants "perceive, often correctly, that they will not receive a fair
and unbiased hearing." 7  All of these reasons reflect deeply
embedded realities of the criminal justice system, and are not easily
fixed by simply having competent assistance of counsel at the plea
bargaining stage. Rather, these realities require, for example,
changes to the heavy potential trial penalties and more complete
discovery.m
D. Trial Penalty
A defendant who does not take a plea deal and decides to go to
trial will, on average, receive a sentence that is substantially higher
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. See infra Section V.C.
269. Plea-Bargaining Law, supra note 27, at 616. The main evidence against
defendants in both the Rampart and Tulia scandals was police officer testimony, which, in
the absence of impeachment or other information, is difficult for defendants to counter at
trial.
270. Id. at 617.
271. Id.
272. Covey argues that better discovery rules could prevent some of these cases. Id. at
617-18. For a discussion of the discovery in the context of plea bargaining, see generally
Cynthia Alkon, Guaranteeing the Right to Defense Discovery in Plea Bargaining Fifty
Years after Brady v. Maryland, 38 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE (forthcoming 2014).
For a more extensive discussion of the trial penalty, see infra Section V.C.
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than a defendant who accepts a plea deal.273 Researchers report that
defendants who go to trial and are found guilty can receive prison
sentences that are over four times higher than those who plead
guilty.274 Virtually every defense lawyer has had the experience of
seeing a defendant "slammed" after trial when the judge sentenced
him to a much longer sentence than that offered before trial.275 This
experience can impact how lawyers talk to their clients as they will
understand that a much heavier sentence is very possible, if not
probable.276 The trial penalty also influences whether plea bargaining
is an adversarial or problem-solving negotiation. As Carrie Menkel-
Meadow observed when discussing adversarial negotiation,
"[niegotiators too often conclude that they are limited to what would
be available if the court entered a judgment." 277 Criminal codes are
clear on the possible maximum sentences on conviction, contributing
to an atmosphere of "bargaining in the shadow of the law." 278 The
trial penalty casts a very real "shadow" over plea negotiations, and
the threat of a substantially harsher sentence is part of the
atmosphere of every plea bargain, even if it is not explicitly discussed
273. For a scathing report on how the trial penalty impacts plea bargaining in felony
drug cases in the United States, see generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, An Offer You Can't
Refuse: How U.S. Federal Prosecutors Force Drug Defendants to Plead Guilty (Dec. 2013),
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usl213_ForUploadO-O .pdf.
274. See Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in
Sentences After Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 959, 992 (2005) (reporting trial penalties ranging from thirteen percent to
four hundred sixty-one percent, depending on the state and the offense); Plea-Bargaining
Law, supra note 27, at 224-30 (stating that the actual trial penalty could be substantially
higher due to the fact that most statistics compare the sentence for similar charges and do
not consider the fact that plea bargains often include pleading guilty to a lesser offense
than the one originally charged); see also Berthoff v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 2d 50, 67-
68 (D. Mass. 2001).
275. For an article describing dilemmas many defense lawyers and their clients face
due to the trial penalty, see Richard A. Oppel Jr., Sentencing Shift Gives New Leverage to
Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/26/us/tough-
sentences-help-prosecutors-push-for-plea-bargains.html?pagewanted=all.
276. For a view that defense lawyers may distort expected outcomes at trial, thereby
influencing client decisions to accept deals and plead guilty, see Richard Birke, Reconciling
Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 205, 247-49 (1999). This is an
example of the availability bias where a person thinks something is likely to happen
because it the person has seen it or experienced it before, thereby making it seem
available. See, e.g., Joseph W. Rand, Understanding Why Good Lawyers Go Bad: Using
Case Studies in Teaching Cognitive Bias in Legal Decision-Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV.
731, 745-46 (2003).
277. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 222, at 789.
278. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornbausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968-69 (1979).
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by the prosecutor and the defense lawyer in the plea negotiation
itself.279
E. Is there a BATNA?
In recent years scholars have begun analyzing plea bargaining as
a form of negotiation.' Interest-based negotiation theory holds that
individual parties should consider their "best alternative to a
negotiated agreement" ("BATNA") as part of their basic preparation
for negotiation as they evaluate what deals to accept.8  But, is this
basic tenet of interest-based negotiation theory applicable in plea
bargaining?' For most criminal defense lawyers, the concept of a
BATNA, although a standard part of negotiation theory, is often not
a helpful aid in their analysis of the case and the issues confronting
the typical client during plea bargaining. Roger Fisher, William Ury,
and Bruce Patton state in Getting to Yes that "[t]he reason you
negotiate is to produce something better than the results you can
obtain without negotiating."23 They go on to advise that the BATNA
is "the standard against which any proposed agreement should be
measured."m The concern is that without analyzing their BATNA,
279. See supra note 275 and accompanying text; but see Stephanos Bibas, Plea
Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2466-67 (2004)
[hereinafter Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial] (positing that the shadow of
trial argument is oversimplified in the context of plea bargaining because "the classical
model supposes that trials set normatively desirable benchmarks and cast strong
shadows." Id. at 2466. As there are so many possible other factors that can account for
plea bargain results apart from the "strength of the evidence and expected punishment
after trial.") Id. at 2467.
280. See generally Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to "Guilty": Plea Bargaining
as Negotiation, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115 (1997) (concluding that negotiation theory is
applicable to plea bargaining); Michael M. O'Hear & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Dispute
Resolution in Criminal Law, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (2007); Plea Bargaining Outside the
Shadow of Trial, supra note 279; Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in
Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911 (2006). For an earlier analysis studying how
lawyers discuss plea bargaining, see generally DOUGLAS W. MAYNARD, INSIDE PLEA
BARGAINING: THE LANGUAGE OF NEGOTIATION (1984).
281. See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES 97-106 (1991).
282. For an analysis that uses BATNA in discussing plea bargaining, see Hollander-
Blumoff, supra note 280, at 116, n.5 (described by the author as a sample "too small to
offer anything other than anecdotal data."). This analysis, however, seems to assume that
there is more room for movement; it also seems as if it is based, in part, on interviews with
a small group of lawyers. This may, therefore, reflect the particular realities of that
jurisdiction or the individual experiences of those lawyers, and not be more widely
applicable.
283. FISHER ET AL., supra note 281, at 100.
284. Id.
605
people may see options that do not exist; they may be too optimistic,
or too committed to reaching agreement since they see no other
option." Getting to Yes recommends that determining a BATNA
involves "(1) inventing a list of actions you might conceivably take if
no agreement is reached; (2) improving some of the more promising
ideas and converting them into practical alternatives; and (3)
selecting, tentatively, the one alternative that seems best." 28 6 It is hard
to see how working through this approach will be helpful to the
typical criminal defendant who has no real defense and no leverage
except for the threat of forcing the case to trial. For example, the "list
of actions" is usually limited to two: take the deal or go to trial.m
There is no option of not proceeding with the case, as there might be
in many other types of conflicts or contract negotiations because once
charges are filed the prosecutor rarely dismisses&8 Moreover, in the
absence of a dismissal, the defendant is locked into proceeding
forward with the case."
It is hard to "improve on the promising ideas" in, for example, a
case of driving under the influence of alcohol where the defendant
was driving and his blood alcohol level tested well above the legal
limit. There are no motions to run, no option of getting the case
dismissed through some procedural maneuvering, and no leverage to
convince the prosecutor that he should give a different deal from
every other driving under the influence of alcohol case passing
through that jurisdiction. 2' The defendant's options are simply to
take the deal, or go to trial and get a worse result.29'
285. Id. at 100-01.
286. Id. at 101.
287. There are conceivably a number of issues that could be open for negotiation.
However, in cases where there are standard offers-such as drug and driving under the
influence of alcohol cases-there are few opportunities for negotiation on a variety of
issues. For a list of possible negotiation points during plea bargaining, see HERMAN, supra
note 29, at 90-92.
288. Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 280, at 121.
289. Id.
290. Motions may not help to get better deals and, therefore, may also not be a
BATNA. See, e.g., Hoffman et al., supra note 113, at 230 (An empirical study in Denver
looking in part at whether public defenders run fewer motions, and if that is why they
might get worse deals in felony cases. The study concluded that public defenders run as
many motions, but their clients are "self-selected for guilt" meaning that those who are
"more guilty" are more likely to use a public defender and less likely to hire private
counsel.).
291. First-time misdemeanor offenders may not, in fact, get penalized for going to
trial. For example, when I was a public defender in Los Angeles, I took a number of
driving under the influence of alcohol cases to trial with clients who had no previous
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Another example, this time in a less typical case, may help to
illustrate how, even in the face of a defense, most defendants do not
have much of a BATNA. Louise is charged with first degree murder.
She killed Bill, her common law husband. Bill had a history,
documented with police reports and convictions, of beating her. One
day, Bill beat her in front of multiple witnesses. She managed to get
away, but later, as she was walking home, with no witnesses around,
Bill approached her and said, "I'm gonna kill you." When he got
close enough to start beating her, she stabbed him with a small knife.
She stabbed him once, and that stab went directly to Bill's heart.
Louise thought she had managed to get Bill to stop his attack and she
didn't look back as she ran away (the fight happened outside).
However, hours later, when the police came to arrest her, Louise
learned that she had killed Bill with that one stab. Louise was
charged with first-degree murder, an offense which carries a sentence
of life in prison. As most readers will recognize, Louise has a strong
self-defense argument. But, if she goes to trial and loses on the first-
degree murder charge, she will be sentenced to life in prison.
Louise's lawyer finds the old police reports detailing previous
beatings, finds witnesses to testify to the beating on the night of Bill's
death, gets medical reports, and prepares the case as it should be
prepared. After several plea negotiation meetings between the
defense lawyer and the prosecution, the prosecutor offers Louise a
deal: time served, three years of probation, and a guilty plea to a
voluntary manslaughter charge. After much agonizing, Louise takes
the deal. She does not want to risk going to trial and being found
guilty. In this case, did Louse have a BATNA? Louise had a
defense, and her defense lawyer used that information in the plea
negotiation process. In that sense, this case is different from the
standard DUI or drug possession case. But, after the prosecutor
makes his final offer, Louise has two options: take the deal or go to
trial. If she goes to trial and wins, she will walk away a free woman.
And, this seems a strong case on the facts. But, if Louise goes to trial
and loses, she will spend the rest of her life in prison (as parole is not
an option in this jurisdiction for first-degree murder convictions).
Can going to trial, which means leaving the decision in the hands
of the jurors, be considered a BATNA in the true sense of the word?
Getting to Yes suggests that a BATNA should be realistic; it should be
record and, if they were convicted, judges frequently sentenced my clients to essentially
the same standard deal that was offered before trial.
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something that a person can count on as an option.2 " Acquittal at
trial does not comfortably fit into this category.293 For Louise, the
stakes of going to trial and losing are too high to risk, even with a
good defense. If she were going to trial on the voluntary
manslaughter charge, it might be worth the risk because the potential
penalty for that offense is substantially lower, but the prosecutor will
not dismiss the more serious charge. This makes the plea negotiation
a zero-sum game and one in which Louise is risking a life of freedom
versus a life spent behind bars. Faced with this "sure thing" of getting
out immediately or risking a life in prison, most defendants will take
the "sure thing." 294
Even in less extreme examples where a defendant is offered
some years in prison, but has a potential maximum of many more, it is
hard to see trial as a BATNA-particularly in those cases where the
defendant committed the offense and where there is no defense. In
cases without a defense, the defendant is left with the option of
accepting the deal the prosecutor offers or going to trial and getting a
worse result. In these circumstances, trial is a "worst alternative to a
negotiated agreement ("WATNA") at best. For most defendants, the
concept of a BATNA is neither applicable nor useful. The lack of a
meaningful BATNA is one reason, if not the fundamental reason,
that many plea negotiations include hard-bargaining tactics:
prosecutors recognize that they can get away with it as they recognize
that the defendant has two choices: take the offer or get a worse
sentence after trial. Plea bargaining is all too often not much of a
negotiation, but rather a take-it-or-leave-it conversation where the
prosecutor holds all the cards, and the defendant can either decide to
cut his losses, or compound them.
292. FISHER ET AL., supra note 281, at 100-01.
293. For example, from 1989-2002, the federal jury trial conviction rate was eighty-
four percent. Andrew D. Leipold, Why are Federal Judges so Acquittal Prone?, 3 WASH.
U. L.Q. 151, 152 (2005).
294. Some might refer to this as making a rational choice under a market theory of
plea bargaining, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J.
LEGAL STUD. 289, 308 (1983); Richard P. Adelstein, The Negotiated Guilty Plea: A
Framework for Analysis, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 783, 809 (1978); H. Richard Uviller, Pleading
Guilty: A Critique of Four Models, 41 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 102, 102-03 (1977).
295. FEELEY, supra note 253, at 187 ("To the extent that there is any negotiation at
all, it is a debate over the nature of the case, and hinges largely on establishing the
relevant 'facts' which flow from various interpretations of the police report.").
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F. What Are the Interests?
In analyzing any negotiation, a classic starting point is to
determine the interests of the various parties.296 In contrast to the
discussion on whether the concept of a BATNA contributes much to
an analysis of plea bargaining, interests are highly relevant to
understanding how plea bargaining works both in the aggregate and
within each individual case. In each plea negotiation, no matter how
simple it may seem on its face, there are multiple interests at play.
Understanding the interests of the various parties is key to
understanding how-or if-to address plea bargaining reform.
It is important to understand that plea bargaining with a
represented client involves a variety of players: the prosecutor, the
prosecutor's boss, the defense attorney, the defendant, and the judge.
Most plea bargains require all parties to agree, although it is possible
that a defendant would plead against the advice of counsel.
The insiders understand that there are several key shared
interests in plea negotiations. Foremost in the minds of every
prosecutor, judge, and defense lawyer is the need to manage their
caseloads and "move the cases" through the court.297 This necessity
acts as one of the few checks on prosecutorial power, as defense
lawyers would likely advise their clients to go to trial and reject plea
offers that are outside the norm and higher than the sentence a judge
would be expected to give. All of the professionals in the system also
have an interest in maintaining or establishing their professional
reputation.298 How this plays out may be different depending on the
party. For prosecutors, being "tough" and getting convictions may be
the primary concern, both for their reputation in the larger legal
community and for promotion purposes. 299 Local politics can also be
a factor. The district attorney is usually elected and some of the
policies surrounding how particular kinds of cases are handled and
296. FISHER ET AL., supra note 281, at 40-55.
297. See, e.g., BIBAS, MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 41-54;
FISHER, supra note 6, at 8-10.
298. One study found that federal prosecutors working in parts of the country with
higher salaries for lawyers in the private sector went to trial more often, thereby
positioning themselves to increase their marketability and salaries if they moved into
private practice. Higher trial rates led to higher sentences post-trial. Richard T. Boylan et
al., Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career Objectives of Federal Prosecutors, 48 J.L. & ECON.
627, 632-42 (2005).
299. For a description of the variety of interests that may motivate a prosecutor
beyond a desire to win, see Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive Bias, and
Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 183, 187-89 (2007).
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what kind of plea deals are possible, or not, may be closely linked to
electoral politics." For defense lawyers, it may matter to not be seen
as a "dump truck"-a lawyer who is afraid of trial and pleads their
clients guilty, regardless of whether the deal is good or not.30' In many
public defender offices, promotions are based, in part, on the number
of jury trials; so, defense lawyers in those offices are conscious of the
need to do trials for career advancement.3 02 Many judges are
concerned both that they do not have too many of their cases
overturned on appeal and, perhaps more importantly, that they do
not get bad publicity in the local media.303 This can make judges look
more favorably at plea deals because guilty pleas are rarely appealed.
It may mean, however, that judges will be more hesitant to accept a
plea bargain that is out of the ordinary, including a deal that might
make a judge look like she is being "soft on crime." At the local and
state levels, judges are regularly elected into their positions and, as
with district attorneys, reelection is an underlying interest.30 It is also
likely that most judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers will state
that an underlying interest is making sure the cases are handled fairly
and with justice, although the prosecutorial or defense view of what is
fair and just will not agree in each case.
In addition to the shared interests, each of the professionals in
the system has different interests. Prosecutors and judges share an
300. See generally Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 581 (2009).
301. When I worked in the Los Angeles County Public Defender's office in the 1990s,
I understood that this was not the reputation I wanted to build. The term was also
regularly thrown around by clients who often complained that their lawyers "just want to
dump me" or that they had a "dump truck" for a lawyer.
302. As a newer public defender, I was repeatedly told that the fastest road to
promotion was through establishing that I was not "afraid" to go to trial. Public defenders
who worked in courts with lower trial rates and/or who were master negotiators were not
rewarded for their good negotiating skills. The idea that public defenders are first and
foremost "trial lawyers" seems alive and well in more recent times, see Albert-Goldberg,
supra note 107, at 457.
303. In Los Angeles, we referred to this as the "metro section test"-as that was the
section in the Los Angeles Times that would report on crime and courts, and no judge
wanted to find themselves featured in this section, particularly with any story that might
make them look "soft on crime."
304. Whether a judge has a higher chance of losing her seat in an election seems to be
influenced by the type of judicial election it is; whether voters are simply indicating "yes or
no;" or whether there is a contested election. For a study that indicates judges have a
lesser chance of winning reelection in a contested election, see generally Claire S. H. Lim,
Preferences and Incentives of Appointed and Elected Public Officials, 103 AM. ECON. REV.
1360 (2013).
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interest in protecting the public.305 Prosecutors want high conviction
rates." Prosecutors often have to follow office-wide policies
regarding what charges to file or drop or how to approach plea
bargaining.3" An example of this is the Department of Justice
("DOJ") which has policies regarding charging and plea bargaining
including requiring federal prosecutors to "charge the most serious
offense that is consistent with the nature of the defendant's conduct,
and that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction."3 The DOJ
requires supervisors to review all charging decisions and plea
agreements. 3 ' The DOJ also specifies that "[aIll prosecutorial
requests for departures or variances-upward or downward-must be
based upon specific and articulable factors, and require supervisory
approval."310 The DOJ's underlying interest in this hierarchical
approach seems to be uniformity in treatment, as the stated policy is
that "[plersons who commit similar crimes and have similar
culpability should, to the extent possible, be treated similarly.""'
In August of 2013, Attorney General Holder issued a new
Memorandum specifically regarding charging decisions for "certain"
305. Defense lawyers may share this interest as citizens, but in their professional role,
their duty is to zealously represent their clients, not protect the public at large. See, e.g.,
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7-1 (1981); see also MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCI Preamble (1983).
306. For an extreme example of this, see Jessica Fender, DA Chambers Offers
Bonuses for Prosecutors who Hit Conviction Targets, THE DENVER POST (Mar. 23, 2011),
http://www.deverpost.com/ci-17686874#.
307. In the federal system, the U.S. Department of Justice has guidelines that were
issued to all federal prosecutors. See, e.g., Memorandum on Charging in Drug Cases,
supra note 195, at 2.
308. Id.
309. See, e.g., Memorandum from Eric Holder, Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Department Policy on Charging and Sentencing 2 (May 19, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/oip/holder-memo-charging-sentencing.pdf ("All charging decisions
must be reviewed by a supervising attorney.") [hereinafter Memorandum on Charging and
Sentencing]. In plea bargaining, "prosecutors should seek a plea to the most serious
offense that is consistent with the nature of the defendant's conduct and likely to result in
a sustainable conviction ... Memorandum on Charging in Drug Cases, supra note 195,
at 2. The policy goes on to state that "[c]harges should not be filed simply to exert
leverage to induce a plea, nor should charges be abandoned to arrive at a plea bargain that
does not reflect the seriousness of the defendant's conduct." Id.
310. Id. at 3. The memo allows some discretion, but clearly requires supervisory
review at each stage of the process limiting the discretion of individual federal prosecutors.
311. Id. at 1. This drive for uniformity may be changing. In August 2013, the
Department of Justice Released "Smart on Crime," which outlines changes to some key
policies, including a call for "the development of district-specific guidelines for
determining when federal prosecutions should be brought." Smart on Crime, supra note
149, at 2.
611Spring 2014] FAILURE TO FIX PLEA BARGAINING
drug cases.312 This Memorandum is in addition to-and not a
substitute for-the May 2010 Memorandum on Charging and
Sentencing. Among the most significant changes for the purposes of
this discussion, federal prosecutors are instructed to "ensure that our
most severe mandatory minimum penalties are reserved for serious,
high-level, or violent drug traffickers."313 Specifically, the memo
instructs that "prosecutors should decline to charge the quantity
necessary to trigger a mandatory minimum sentence if the defendant
meets" certain criteria.31 While this change in approach may mean
far fewer defendants are sentenced to long terms on drug offenses in
the federal system, it does not change the basic structure, which
requires prosecutors to seek higher level approval before declining to
file certain charges or declining to file certain enhancements."
Defense lawyers have an interest in maintaining, or building, a
good relationship with their clients, which can be seriously impacted
by how lawyers are paid or the organizational structure within which
they work.' For example, lawyers may want to handle the case
quickly if they are paid a flat fee regardless of how many court
appearances they make before trial, or they may string the case along
if they are paid by the court appearance (i.e., the more court
appearances, the more money). The connection between money and
quality of representation can be even more direct when the defendant
is indigent and relies on appointed counsel.' How lawyers are paid
can have a serious impact on whether they are providing adequate
assistance or assistance in name only."' When lawyers are paid a
312. See generally Memorandum on Charging in Drug Cases, supra note 195.
313. Id.
314. Id. The criteria is focused on whether the defendant used violence, was a leader
in a gang or other criminal organization, has ties to serious drug trafficking organizations,
and the defendant's criminal history. Id.
315. Id. at 3 ("In keeping with current policy, prosecutors are reminded that all
charging decisions must be reviewed by a supervisory attorney to ensure adherence to the
Principles of Federal Prosecution, the guidance provided . . . [in the] May 19, 2010
memorandum, and the policy outlined in this memorandum.").
316. For felony cases, the Los Angeles County Public Defender's Office strives to
provide vertical representation-the same lawyer representing the same defendant at each
stage of the case-in part to aid relations with clients. Albert-Goldberg, supra note 107, at
458.
317. How lawyers are paid makes a difference in the type of representation and the
quality of the plea bargains. See generally Iyengar, supra note 113. See also supra Section
IV.A.
318. See, e.g., Andrew Cohen, How Americans Lost the Right to Counsel, 50 Years
After Gideon, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2013, 11:09 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/
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small amount that is substantially below the rate they would be paid
to handle other cases, it is no surprise that the representation suffers.
Moreover, lawyers may not have resources to do things like
investigate a case before pleading it out.319
In addition to the professional players in plea bargaining, there
are also defendants and victims. Defendants' interests include the
obvious: They want to get the best deal they can, preferably getting
the case dismissed. For defendants that are innocent, or feel that they
were wronged in the process by, for example, police misconduct, they
may want to be vindicated or to get the opportunity to tell their
story.320 Victims often share an interest in wanting to have their story
heard.321 Victims may also want restitution or payment for the harm
they suffered.322 Often, both victims and defendants would rather the
case just be over as quickly as possible as they do not want to come to
court. Victims may also want a sense of closure from the offense. 3
Plea bargaining often fails to meet many of these interests for both
victims and defendants. In most jurisdictions the victim will be
notified, often well after the fact, that the defendant has pled guilty.324
This means that even if they wanted to, they often have no
opportunity to confront the defendant in open court.
Despite their very different positions in the criminal justice
system, both defendants and victims usually share an interest in
wanting to leave feeling that the process was fair. This interest is
supported by studies on procedural justice finding that the process is
national/archive/2013/03/how-americans-lost-the-right-to-counsel-50-years-after-gideon/27
3433/.
319. This can be an issue if lawyers need a court order to authorize hiring an outside
expert. See, e.g., Albert-Goldberg, supra note 107, at 455.
320. See, e.g., O'Hear, supra note 19, at 416-17.
321. The traditional criminal justice system's failure to respond to victims' needs is
one of the reasons restorative justice proponents offer for the value of using restorative
justice processes. See, e.g., Mark S. Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice in the Twenty-First
Century: A Social Movement Full of Opportunities and .Pitfalls, 89 MARO. L. REV. 251,
260, 273-75 (2005).
322. States commonly have restitution funds and order defendants to pay restitution
as part of their sentence. For a brief description intended to describe to victims how
restitution works, see NATIONAL CENTER FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, Restitution,
http://www.victimsofcrime.org/help-for-crime-victims/get-help-bulletins-for-crime-victims/
restitution. For an example from the federal system, see 18 U.S.C. § 3663.
323. See, e.g., Maureen E. Laflin, Criminal Mediation Has Taken Root in Idaho's
Courts, 56 ADVOC. 37, 38 (2013).
324. For a general description, see generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE FOR
VICTIMS OF CRIME, Victim Input Into Plea Agreements (Nov. 2002), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc-archives/bulletins/legalseries/bulletin7/ncj189188.pdf.
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more important to people than the outcome.32 If people find that the
process was fair or just, then they are more satisfied with the system.326
Procedural justice scholarship examines underlying attitudes and
views about the legal process, looking at "four critical factors" that
lead people to perceive a process as fair. These factors include: (1)
people being able to "state their case" to legal authorities; (2) people
being treated with dignity; (3) neutral authorities; and (4) authorities
with good or "benevolent" intentions.327 Michael O'Hear
recommends adopting "procedural justice process norms" to change
how prosecutors conduct plea bargaining." He recommends that the
plea bargaining process should allow defendants to tell their story (to
be heard); that there should be objective (or fair) standards for the
negotiations; that the reasons for a position in negotiation should be
explained; and that prosecutors should avoid "pressure tactics like
exploding offers and charging threats."3 29 These kinds of procedural
justice processes for both defendants and victims are generally absent
in the way plea bargaining is conducted.
Overall, plea bargaining meets the underlying interests of most
of the insiders within the process. For defense attorneys and
prosecutors, plea bargaining does efficiently manage caseloads and
workloads, even if defense attorneys often do not like the outcome
for their clients. Prosecutors may, at times, share that frustration.
Defendants and victims-the parties most directly affected-often
find that their interests are not met in the plea bargaining process.
Nonetheless, as long as the basic interests of judges, prosecutors, and,
to an extent, defense attorneys are met by the current system, making
any substantial changes will likely be met with resistance and may
reflect, in part, why the Supreme Court has not yet made any
decisions that would require substantial change in how plea
bargaining is conducted in the United States.
325. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 163 (1990); TOM R.
TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION
WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 196 (2002) [hereinafter TRUST IN THE LAW]; Tom R.
Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST.
283, 286 (2003) [hereinafter Procedural Justice, Legitimacy].
326. See, e.g., TRUST IN THE LAW, supra note 325, at 49-75. Procedural Justice,
Legitimacy, supra note 325, at 286; O'Hear, supra note 19, at 420-21.
327. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law? The
Findings of Psychological Research on Deference to Authority, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 661,
664 (2007).
328. See generally O'Hear, supra note 19, at 425.
329. Id. at 426-32.
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VI. Immediate Impact of Lafler and Frye
The problems with plea bargaining reach far beyond the single
issue of incompetent assistance of counsel that the Supreme Court
addressed in Lafler and Frye. While these decisions will not address
the more serious structural problems discussed above, they will have
an immediate impact.3 o The impact of Lafler and Frye will be limited
to addressing single instances of bad lawyering and some changes in
the Legal Framework Structures for defendants. It is unlikely that
these Court decisions will have an impact on either Indigent Defense
Structures or Prosecutorial Power Structures.331
The Indigent Defense Structures that impede plea bargaining are
primarily resource issues and are closely related to how much money
is available for the defense to do its job. Lafler and Frye did not
address resource issues as those questions were not before the Court
in those cases. However, meaningful plea bargaining reform must
address resource issues as these issues are fundamentally embedded
into how defense lawyers can do their jobs.332 Lawyers need
reasonable caseloads to have adequate time to interview and counsel
their clients and to do the work required to prepare their cases.
Lawyers should also have ready access to assistance by investigators
and experts to aid in the preparation of their cases during plea
bargaining.
Legislatures have spent decades carefully building Prosecutorial
Power Structures into penal codes around the country. When the law
allows a variety of ways to charge the same offense, with wildly
different possible punishments, the legislature has built into the
structure of the law extraordinary powers for prosecutors. As was
discussed above, this means that the decision of what to charge is
often the most important decision in a case and this single charging
decision can determine the range of possible outcomes. This is even
truer in jurisdictions with mandatory (or quasi-mandatory) sentencing
guidelines because they include mandatory minimums and mandatory
sentencing enhancements; this can prevent judges from exercising
discretion to neutralize harsh prosecutorial charging decisions.
330. Incompetent Plea Bargaining, supra note 216, at 159 ("Though [Lafler and Frye]
reflect a significant jurisprudential debate, in practice their holdings are unlikely to upset
many convictions or disrupt other aspects of judges' day-to-day work .... ").
331. As this article discusses, these three structures are impediments to improving
plea bargaining for defendants.
332. See discussion supra Section III.A.
333. See discussion supra Section III.A.2.
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It is unlikely that "there will be cases galore"' arising from
Lafler and Frye, as there are many hurdles to appealing a case after a
plea bargain has been concluded (or a trial has been conducted)."'
One reason that it is unlikely there will be a huge influx of new
appellate cases, as Bibas points out, is that the standard applied in
Lafler and Frye is not new and is already the applicable standard in
many state jurisdictions and federal districts.336 Even when cases
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel reach an appellate level,
judges are much more likely to deny the claims, regularly finding such
claims "unsupported, implausible, and insubstantial."337 One reality
that Justice Scalia did not mention is that an explicit agreement to
waive appellate rights is now a standard part of many plea deals.3
One study of federal appeal waivers found that over two-thirds of
plea bargains in the federal system include an appeal waiver.33' Thus
far, judges are finding that these appeal waivers block later claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel.340
However, several state bars consider some appellate waivers to
be ethical violations. For example, the Florida Bar released an ethics
opinion stating that it is an ethical violation for a plea bargain to
include a requirement that the defendant waive any later claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct during
the plea bargain.341 In deciding these waivers were unethical, Florida
looked to similar decisions by the state bars in Missouri,342 Vermont, 3
334. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399,1413 (2012).
335. See, e.g., King, supra note 60, at 2438-56; Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining,
supra note 216, at 152; Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J.
2650, 2673 (2013).
336. Incompetent Plea Bargaining, supra note 216, at 161.
337. King, supra note 60, at 2435; see also Incompetent Plea Bargaining, supra note
216, at 162 (2012) (observing that "judges are naturally skeptical and loath to overturn
convictions and sentences" and due to the large number of claims already going into the
appellate courts, judges "risk disregarding the valid ones as well").
338. Nancy J. King & Michael E. O'Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing
Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 212 (2005).
339. Id.
340. King, supra note 60, at 2436.
341. PROF. ETHICS OF THE FLA. BAR, Op. 12-1 (June 2011).
342. ADVISORY COMM. OF SUPREME COURT OF MO., Formal Op. 126 (2009) (stating
that it is a conflict of interest for a lawyer to ask a client to waive ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, and prejudicial to the administration of justice for a prosecutor to ask for a
waiver of prosecutorial misconduct).
343. VT. BAR ASS'N, Advisory Ethics Op. 95-04 (finding it unethical because "a
lawyer should not attempt to exonerate himself from or limit his liability to his client for
personal malpractice").
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and North Carolina.-3 As the Florida opinion states, "a criminal
defense lawyer has a personal conflict of interest when advising a
client regarding waiving the right to later collateral proceedings
regarding ineffective assistance of counsel."3"  The opinion also
considered it "prejudicial to the administration of justice for a
prosecutor to require the criminal defendant to waive claims of
prosecutorial misconduct when the prosecutor is in the best position,
and indeed may be the only person, to be aware that misconduct has
taken place."3" These opinions do not go so far as to prohibit all
appellate waivers in plea bargaining, just waivers of ineffective of
counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. These ethical opinions,
however, provide important leverage for defense lawyers to not have
their clients agree to these provisions as part of a plea deal. As the
Federal Public Defender for the Southern District of Florida
observed, "[p]lea bargaining is not give and take. The government
has tremendous leverage over the defense bar and clients. It's more a
take-it-or-leave-it situation, and more often than not with certain
prosecutors it will be leave it unless your client waives all of his
collateral rights.""
Defense lawyers who practice in the few states with state bars
that have issued such ethics opinions will probably be able to
effectively negotiate so that these provisions are not part of the plea
deal, as to do otherwise would put their bar license at risk. In the
absence of such an ethics opinion, or eventual court opinion,
appellate waivers are likely to continue to be a routine part of plea
bargaining, particularly in federal cases, and will make it unlikely that
many of these cases will be appealed.
In addition to appellate waivers, there are clear indications that,
after Lafler and Frye, judges and prosecutors are taking steps to
create better records so that plea bargains are not overturned on
appeal. For example, not long after the Lafler and Frye decisions
were issued, an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Western District of
Tennessee filed a motion requesting not only that the plea offer be
clearly stated on the record, but also that the defense state the
344. N.C. STATE BAR, Ethics Op. 129 (1993) (discussing the personal conflict of
interest for the defense lawyer and comparing it to malpractice claims).
345. PROF. ETHIcs OF THE FLA BAR, Op. 12-1 (June 2011). The opinion also looked
at the issue in terms of whether it was an impermissible limiting of liability for malpractice
(which is prohibited under Fla. R. Prof. Cond. § 4-1.8(h)). Id.
346. Id.
347. Gary Blankenship, Board Adopts Hotly Debated Plea Bargain Ethics Opinion, THE
FLA. BAR NEWS (Jan. 1, 2013), https://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOMIJN/JNnews0l.nsf.
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content of "any plea related discussions" including the "attorneys'
advice to their clients.""' The motion recognized that these
discussions could be privileged and concedes that they should be
sealed and not shown to the prosecution, but the motion failed to
recognize the clear problems with requiring defense attorneys to
divulge contents of conversations with their clients.349 At the state
level, the Nashville and Davidson County District Attorney's Office
in Tennessee reported that it has a new form for defense lawyers to
sign, stating the plea offer terms and that the lawyer conveyed the
offer to the client.3 o Defense lawyers must agree to complete this
form before prosecutors make an offer. 351 Additionally, if the case is
set for trial, the defendant has to sign a form stating that he "has been
advised of the State's offer(s) and the benefits and disadvantages of
proceeding to trial."352 Some prosecutors also request defendants sign
a "statement of satisfaction" with their lawyers, or require all offers
and replies to be in writing.353 The changes that prosecutors, judges,
and defense lawyers are likely to make will not address the systemic
problems; rather, they will focus on making guilty pleas "bullet
proof. 3 1
These additions are simply extensions of the Court's
recommendations in Frye that courts, when taking the guilty plea,
should "establish . . . that the defendant has been given proper
advice."3 ' Nancy King suggests that due to Lafler and Frye, judges
will make sure to "secure on-the-record statements" about the plea
deals-that they were communicated to their clients and that the
defendant was "satisfied with his counsel's advice." 356
348. Lawrence S. Goldman, DOJ's Lafler/Frye Motion Goes Too Far, WHITE
COLLAR CRIME PROF BLOG, (Apr. 5, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
whitecollarcrimeblog/2012/04/dojs-laflerfrye-motion-goes-too-far.html. For the motion
itself, see http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/ motion-pursuant-to-lafler-and-frye-1.pdf
at 1 [hereinafter Tennessee Motion].
349. Tennessee Motion, supra note 348.
350. King, supra note 60, at 2437.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Incompetent Plea Bargaining, supra note 216, at 165. Taken together, these are
examples of what Bibas predicted would happen after Lafler and Frye as "[pjlea
bargaining's semiprivatized justice is best suited to semiprivatized remedies and reforms,
backstopped by judges but driven by other actors." Id.
355. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1406-07 (2012).
356. King, supra note 60, at 2436-37.
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Taken together, these steps of requiring routine appellate
waivers in plea bargains, and requiring specific statements on the
record of plea offers, performance of counsel, and advice to clients
will make ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the context of
plea bargaining tough to bring and tougher still to win.357 Through
these efforts, courts and prosecutors continue to focus on the
formalistic requirements of plea bargaining without addressing the
deeper (and more difficult) systemic problems that cause serious
concerns about the overall fairness of plea bargaining. This approach
is similar to those following other Supreme Court rulings of what is
necessary to render a plea "knowing and voluntary": simply add some
statements to the in-court colloquy where the defendant agrees that
he is "knowingly and voluntarily waiving his right" to a jury trial and
that he has not been "threatened by anyone."3 8 These declarations
are routinely made without any inquiry into whether they are true,
and once the defendant agrees that they are true, these statements
present a hurdle to overturning the guilty plea on appeal.
The Court is likely to provide a better definition of what is
required for a lawyer to be "competent" in defined parts of the plea
bargaining process.' There are a number of cases on appeal at the
state supreme court and federal appellate court level that could
improve the definition of "competence." These cases primarily fall
under the category of client counseling during plea bargaining;
examples include failure to advise about direct consequences of the
plea, such as how much time a defendant will actually serve in
prison;" failure to advise about possible determinative motions, such
as a motion to dismiss due to a violation of a speedy indictment
rule;31' failure to accurately advise about the law, such as whether the
facts support a specific degree of a crime; 362 failure to advise about
357. Id.
358. These are standard parts of a guilty plea delivered in court. For an example of
the "cheat sheet" that judges use when taking a guilty plea, see Judges' Bench Book,
Taking Pleas of Guilty or nolo contendere, available at http://www.almd.uscourts.gov/
rulesproc/docs/guilty-plea-colloquy.pdf.
359. For an article explaining some of the possible standards for effective negotiation
by lawyers in plea bargaining, see generally Batra, supra note 83.
360. See, e.g., Manley v. Belleque, 366 Fed. App'x 734, 735-36 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the defense lawyer's failure to advise the defendant that the state would seek a
hearing in aggregation after pleading guilty was not inadequate assistance).
361. See, e.g., State v. Utter, 803 N.W.2d 647 (Iowa 2011); Ennenga v. State, 812
N.W.2d 696 (Iowa 2012).
362. See, e.g., Garcia v. State of N.M., 237 P.3d 716 (N.M. 2010).
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why a "fast track" plea should have been accepted;3 3 failure to
calculate sentencing guideline range correctly;'6 and failure to
adequately investigate the case.6 It is also likely that the Court will
need to revisit the issue of remedies when there has been ineffective
assistance of counsel in plea bargaining.' As is clear from this list,
the issues arising on appeal are not issues pertaining to the more
serious structural problems discussed in this article. Instead, the cases
focus on defined problems with counsel performance that are specific
to the case itself; therefore, holding for the defendant in any of these
cases would not require larger structural changes to plea bargaining,
but would just add to the list of things that individual lawyers should
do and which, in fairness, most are probably already doing or striving
to do.
Conclusion
Lafler and Frye represent a step forward in that the Supreme
Court is no longer in denial about the importance of plea bargaining
in our criminal justice system. However, this recognition seems
unlikely, in the near term, to cause the Court to look at the serious
structural issues that call into question the fundamental fairness of
plea bargaining. The Court has not shown a willingness to question
hard-bargaining tactics by prosecutors, inordinately high sentences
passed by legislatures, or the trial penalty that defendants suffer when
they exercise their constitutional right to a trial. Since Lafler and
Frye were decided, criminal defendants have continued to enter guilty
pleas with lawyers who often have little time to truly advise them,
without full prosecutorial discovery, with threats of more serious
charges and added enhancements, and often under time pressures to
make quick and potentially life-altering decisions. In the immediate
363. See, e.g., United States v. Soto-Lopez, 475 Fed. App'x 144 (9th Cir. 2012).
364. See, e.g., Garcia v. United States, 679 F.3d 1013 (8th Cir. 2012).
365. See, e.g., Henley v. Bell, 487 F.3d 379 (6th Cir. 2007); Ex Parte Harrington, 310
S.W.3d 452 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Johnson v. Uribe, 700 F.3d 413 (9th Cir. 2012).
366. For an excellent analysis of how Lafler and Frye approached the question of
remedies and a recommendation of how to proceed with remedies post-Lafler and Frye,
see generally Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Effective Remedies for Ineffective Assistance, 48
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 949 (2013). For an optimistic view of where the remedies issue
could lead, see generally Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Toward a Common Law of Plea
Bargaining, 102 KY. L.J. 1, 5-6 (2013-2014) (arguing that through the remedies issue the
Court has assumed some judicial oversight of prosecutorial discretion whereby "the
Supreme Court has invited lower courts to indirectly develop a set of best practices for the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion").
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aftermath of the decisions, Lafler and Frye seem to have simply
added a few more formalistic requirements into the standard guilty
plea colloquy. Until the Court is ready to grapple with the structural
issues preventing fairness in plea bargaining for defendants, criminal
courts around the country will continue business as usual, and
defendants will continue to accept plea bargains that may not be a
good choice but may be their only choice under the circumstances.
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